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Foreword
History is myth based on consensus, say the cynics. The intent of 
Congress in requiring an audit of annual financial statements by an 
independent public accountant has achieved the status of myth, but 
the consensus is lacking. The SEC and its staff have used the con­
gressional decision to rely on independent auditors as evidence that 
Congress expected the public accounting profession to function as an 
arm of government. For example, it is contended that the independent 
auditor should immediately report violations of law to federal au­
thorities. After all, Congress rejected a corps of federal auditors and 
federal licensing of auditors at the urging of independent auditors who 
testified before it. Would Congress have expected less from independ­
ent auditors than from government auditors?
Others have relied on the same evidence to support an opposite 
view. By rejecting federal auditors, Congress must have been aware 
that a confidential relationship between the auditor and management is 
essential for an effective audit. If the independent auditor is trusted by 
management, both can work together to achieve the best possible 
financial presentation. Casting the auditor as an agent of government 
would undermine the effectiveness of independent audits.
Faced with such contradictory interpretations, the Commission on 
Auditors’ Responsibilities asked Professor Jeremy Wiesen to study the 
legislative history of the securities acts and to extract the auditor’s 
roles and responsibilities as they were envisioned by Congress. His 
study should help to put to rest debates about the implications of the 
decision to favor independent auditors over federal auditors and similar 
discussions. However, no victor emerges in this particular argument 
because both sides have overstated the significance of the decision.
At a time when many of the issues considered by Congress in 1933 
and 1934 are again the subjects of congressional hearings, Professor 
Wiesen’s investigation of earlier legislation should add valuable per­
spective.
This is the second of four studies to be published from the back­
ground research for the Commission on Auditors’ Responsibilities. The 
studies are not part of the commission’s report, but the commission 
believes they contain useful material that warrants wide distribution.
Publication does not necessarily constitute endorsement or approval 
by either the AICPA or the commission. Authors of research studies are 
responsible for the content and recommendations.
Lee J. Seidler 
Deputy Chairman
Commission on Auditors' Responsibilities
D. R. Carmichael 
Research Director
Commission on Auditors’ Responsibilities
iv
Preface
In November, 1977, the Senate Subcommittee on Reports, Account­
ing and Management (Metcalf Committee) wrote: “Prior to this subcom­
mittee’s inquiry, Congress had not made a thorough study of the 
independent auditing system established under the provisions of the 
Federal securities laws since they were enacted more than 40 years 
ago.” The congressional consideration of auditors’ duties in 1933-1934 
is the subject of this monograph.
The nature and extent of the congressional consideration of audit­
ing at the enactment of the securities acts should be considered by 
courts and the SEC when they apply the acts to auditors, and it should 
be examined by Congress before it adopts new legislation affecting 
auditors. The Commission on Auditors’ Responsibilities was particularly 
interested in the subject as it related to the auditor’s role in society.
I was greatly assisted on preliminary drafts of this study by the 
following members and staff of the Commission on Auditors’ Respon­
sibilities: Manuel F. Cohen, chairman until his death in June, 1977; Lee 
J. Seidler, deputy chairman; Henry R. Jaenicke, principal research 
consultant; Douglas R. Carmichael, research director; and, Patricia 
McConnell, project coordinator. Three accounting historians, Richard 
Brief and Barbara Merino of New York University, and Stephen A. Zeff 
of Rice University, provided helpful insights into the state of auditing in 
the 1930s. Conscientious research of legislative history was performed 
by three New York University research assistants: Stewart S. Karlinsky, 
Susan D. Lewis, and Floyd Tupper.
The text and footnotes of the final draft of this study were exten­
sively edited for publication.
Special recognition must be given to the considerable efforts con­
tributed by Richard Eng, a CPA and JD/MBA candidate at New York 
University, and my current research assistant. His auditing experience, 
meticulous research, and skillful draftsmanship were indispensable to 
the study’s publication.
Jeremy Wiesen 
New York, New York 
March, 1978
v
Contents
Introduction
Issues Presented 1
Methodology: Interpreting Legislative Intent 2
1 The Lack of Congressional Intent Regarding Auditors
Congressional Consideration of the Securities Acts 5
Congressional Consideration of the Role of Auditors 
Under the Securities Acts 8
Regulation by Disclosure 11
The State of Auditing in 1933-4 12
Congressional Expectations Regarding the SEC and the 
Accounting Profession 16
Confusion between Auditing and Accounting 18
The Absence of Specific Funding by Congress 18
Conclusion 19
2 General Congressional Expectations
High Expectations 21 
Reliance on Financial Statements 21 
Expectations of Investors 23 
Expectations Regarding the SEC and the Accounting 
Profession 24 
Advancement in Auditing Techniques 24
Low Expectations 25 
Disparagement of Accounting and Auditing 25 
Rejection of Federal Auditors and the Federal Licensing of 
Public Auditors 27
3 Specific Congressional Expectations
Responsibility for Accurate Financial Statements 
Auditors vis-à-vis Management 31 
Auditors vis-à-vis Directors 34
Employee Defalcations 36
Testing and Staff Supervision 37
Auditor Competence 38
Auditing Firm Competence 40
Independence Under Client “ Pressure” 42 
The Trend in 1933 42 
Liability Under the Securities Acts 43
Time and Cost Constraints 44 
Time Constraints 44 
Cost Constraints 45
Estimating Income 47
The Auditor’s Report 48
Conclusion
Introduction
Issues Presented
The principal purpose of this study is to examine the nature and 
extent of the responsibilities that Congress intended auditors to as­
sume at the time of enactment of the Securities Act of 1933 (1933 act) 
and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (1934 act, and with the 1933 
act, referred to herein as “the securities acts” ). This subject is part of 
the broader topic of the independent auditor’s role in society, which 
has been studied by the Commission on Auditors’ Responsibilities 
(CAR) and is discussed in section 1 of its Report, Conclusions, and 
Recommendations.
Chapter 1 describes the significant lack of specific congressional 
intent regarding auditors’ duties in 1933 and 1934. Chapters 2 and 3 
discuss congressional intent that did exist at that time regarding audi­
tors. The Conclusion discusses the impact which congressional expec­
tations ought to have on auditors’ duties under the securities acts.
Dr. Henry R. Jaenicke prepared a study for CAR in which he 
thoroughly discusses common law and statutes affecting auditors, in­
cluding the principal provisions and court interpretations of the se­
curities acts.1 The matter of auditors’ legal liability is closely related to 
their professional responsibilities, the subject of this paper. Note the 
following statement by one of the principal draftsmen of the 1933 act, 
William O. Douglas, in a coauthored article which describes the in­
creased legal responsibilities of auditors under the 1933 act:
To say the least the [1933] Act goes as far in protection of purchasers of 
securities as the plaintiff in Ultramares Corp. v. Touche unsuccessfully 
urged on the New York Court of Appeals to go in the protection of a 
creditor. The change which the court thought so “ revolutionary” as to be 
“wrought by legislation” has been made. And the duty placed on experts 
such as accountants has not been measured by the expert’s relations to 
his employer but by his service to investors.2
1. H. R. Jaenicke, The Effect of Litigation on Independent Auditors, CAR Research 
Study No. 1, (New York: AICPA, 1977).
2. Douglas and Bates, “The Federal Securities Act of 1933,” Yale Law Journal 43 
(1933): 198. Douglas and Bates used the terms accountant and auditor inter­
changeably. This was a prevalent practice at the time the article was written.
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Douglas and Bates point out in a subsequent part of the article that 
Congress did not “measure” the specific obligations of auditors in the 
language of the securities acts.3 Courts and, in turn, the SEC and the 
regulated community of auditors should be concerned with the legisla­
tive intent (or purpose) behind the, statutory provisions. In fact, the 
legislative history could be consulted even if the references and man­
dates to auditors in the securities acts were clear and unambiguous:
It is often said that extrinsic aids may be considered only when a statute is 
ambiguous and not where the language is clear. But ambiguity is not 
uniformly insisted on as a prerequisite to the use of aids to construction. 
Thus it has been said that “ Usually a court looks into the legislative history 
to clear up some statutory ambiguity . . .  but such ambiguity is not the sine 
qua non for a judicial inquiry into legislative history,” and that the “ plain 
meaning rule . . .  is not to be used to thwart or distort the intent of 
Congress by excluding from consideration enlightening materials from the 
legislative files.” 4
Two of the principal draftsmen of the securities acts, James Landis 
and Felix Frankfurter, advocated searching analyses of the history and 
purposes of legislation. Landis, in an article written prior to the enact­
ment of the securities acts, stated: “ Legislative history . . . affords in 
many instances accurate and compelling guides to legislative mean­
ing.”5 Frankfurter, thirteen years after the enactment of the securities 
acts, made the same point:
To be sure, laws can measurably be improved with improvement in the 
mechanics of legislation, and the need for interpretation is usually in 
inverse ratio to the care and imagination of draftsmen. . . .
. . . Laws are not abstract propositions. They are expressions of policy 
arising out of specific situations and addressed to the attainment of par­
ticular ends.6
Methodology: Interpreting Legislative Intent
Legislative interpretation begins with an analysis of the meaning of 
the words of the statute, using various rules on interpretation that the 
courts have developed. An analysis of the language in the securities 
acts reveals little concerning the duties of auditors as shown in Dr. 
Jaenicke’s research study. Further investigation requires study of vari­
ous materials which courts term “extrinsic aids.”
3. See chap. 1, n. 55 and chap. 3, n. 7.
4. J. Sutherland, Statutes and Statutory Construction, 4th ed., vol. 2A (Chicago: Calla­
ghan and Co., 1972), sec. 48.01.
5. Landis, “A Note on ‘Statutory Interpretation’,” Harvard Law Review 43 (1930): 889.
6. Frankfurter, “Some Reflections on the Reading of Statutes,” Columbia Law Review 
47 (1947): 528 and 533.
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Sutherland, in his treatise on statutory interpretation, groups extrin­
sic aids into three chronological categories:
(a) pre-enactment history, i.e., pertinent circumstances and events leading 
up to the introduction of the bill in the legislature, (b) enactment history, 
covering all actions taken during legislative consideration of the bill, includ­
ing statements about it, and (c) post-enactment history.7
Enactment history often provides the greatest resources for de­
ciphering legislative intent. These materials include reports of legisla­
tive committees, transcripts of committee hearings and legislative 
debates, reports of committees and commissions outside the legisla­
ture, executive messages, and the views of draftsmen. Some are 
considered to be more authoritative than others. For example, congres­
sional reports are said to have the greatest authority, while legislative 
debates, the least, since debates may only show individual views and 
motives. This study can not make such fine distinctions because of the 
lack of significant information in the more important resources. There­
fore, legislative hearings have been generously cited, and the views 
expressed by influential congressmen have sometimes been ascribed 
to Congress itself.
Social and economic conditions are informative sources of pre­
enactment history. Sutherland states:
The events occurring immediately prior to the time when an act becomes 
law comprise a most instructive source for information indicative of what 
the legislature intended it to mean. . . . [The history of events] consists 
chiefly in statements by various parties as to the nature and effect of the 
proposed law and statements or other evidence as to evils requiring 
legislative relief. Contemporary history also includes information concerning 
the activities of pressure groups, economic conditions in the country . . . , 
prevailing business practices, and the prior state of the law. . . ,8
Such materials are useful in the analysis of congressional intent re­
garding auditors’ duties because of the paucity of the important types 
of enactment history resources.
Post-enactment history includes an analysis of legislative inaction. 
There is disagreement about its significance:
A number of decisions have held that the acquiescence of the legislature 
through inaction following a contemporaneous and practical interpretation 
is evidence that the legislature intends to adopt such interpretation. But 
legislative inaction has also been called a "weak reed upon which to lean" 
and a “ poor beacon” to follow in construing a statute.9
7. J. Sutherland, Statutes and Statutory Construction, vol. 2A, secs. 48.04-48.18.
8. Ibid., sec. 48.04.
9. Ibid., sec. 49.10.
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In the case of legislation that creates a regulatory agency (such as the 
SEC), interpretations by the agency of the statute are afforded some 
weight if not objected to by the legislature:
Interpretive regulations by officers, administrative agencies, departmental 
heads and others officially charged with the duty of administering and 
enforcing a statute, and their practices which reflect the understanding 
they have of provisions they are charged to carry out, have great weight in 
determining the operation of a statute.10
The limits of this proposition are discussed in the Conclusion.
10. Ibid., sec. 49.05.
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1
The Lack of Congressional 
Intent Regarding Auditors
Congressional Consideration of the Securities Acts
Landis provided the following description of Frankfurter’s request 
for help in drafting the bill that became the 1933 act:
It was a Thursday in early April and my next classes [as Professor of 
Legislation at Harvard Law School] were scheduled for the following Mon­
day. Frankfurter, however, thought that the job could be done over that 
weekend. We consequently left on the night train for Washington. . . .
. . . After a brief session with Frankfurter, where we determined to take as 
the base of our work the English [British] Companies Act with which 
[Benjamin] Cohen was very familiar, Cohen, Corcoran and I set to work. . . . 
By late Saturday night we had a draft of the bill in reasonable shape.1
This vignette is a colorful depiction of what one researcher called the 
“ atmosphere of crisis”2 in which the 1933 act was created. Such 
descriptions are somewhat hyperbolic, however, as Landis states in 
the quote concluding this chapter.
In the first place, Congress had considered securities legislation 
prior to 1933-4. In 1919 Representative Taylor of Colorado introduced a 
bill fashioned from the British Companies Act, and in 1920, the Vol­
1. Landis, “The Legislative History of the Securities Act of 1933,” George Washington 
Law Review 28 (1959): 33-34.
2. R. Chatov, “The Collapse of Corporate Financial Standards Regulations: A Study of 
SEC-Accountant Interaction” (Ph.D. Dissertation, University of California, Berkeley, 
1973), p. 157. The dissertation, in a slightly edited form, has been published under 
the title Corporate Financial Reporting: Public or Private Control, (New York: Free 
Press, 1975).
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stead Bill was introduced, modeled after New York State’s Martin Fraud 
Act; both bills died in committee.3 In 1922, Representative Denison of 
Illinois introduced a bill to prevent fraud in the sale of securities 
through the mails or agencies of interstate commerce. This bill fared 
better than the Taylor bill, but it never passed the Senate. Subse­
quently, a similar bill was introduced by Representative Sabath, and 
the Denison bill was reintroduced (as the LaGuardia bill), but both 
were dead issues by 1933. In addition, there was the Uniform Sales of 
Securities Act, drafted by thirty-eight state securities commissioners. 
Huston Thompson, a lawyer for the American Institute of Accountants 
and one of the drafters of the 1933 act, provided the following insight 
about the proposed 1933 act at the 1933 Senate hearings: “We have 
taken [the registration] requirements from the Uniform Sales of Se­
curities Act, and also from the Taylor bill.’’4
In the second place, the congressional testimony, submissions of 
statements, and committee reports that accompany the securities acts 
fill an eleven-volume set.5 Although specific conclusions cannot be 
drawn from the fact that this congressional “ record” would probably 
outweigh the written record of many other pieces of legislation, the fact 
that the record is not insubstantial is some evidence of congressional 
diligence.
In the third place, the design of the securities acts made them 
more than temporary regulation. This is true of the contemporaneous 
legislation in the 1930s that created the Federal Communications Com­
mission (1934), the Tennessee Valley Authority (1934), the Federal 
Deposit Insurance Corporation (1933), and the Social Security Adminis­
tration (1935). The securities acts are unlike other New Deal programs 
that were merely continuations of the anti-Depression policies created 
during the Hoover administration.6 Finally, Congress employed very 
skilled lawyers to draft the securities acts.
On the other hand, justifiable criticism of the securities acts sup­
ports the proposition that they were not a result of diligent congres­
sional consideration. Securities lawyers have noted the deficiencies in
3. E. T. McCormick, Understanding the Securities Act and the S.E.C., (New York: 
American Book Co., 1948), p. 15; and the statement of Huston Thompson, U.S., 
Congress, Senate, Committee on Banking and Currency, Hearings on S. 875, 73d 
Cong., 1st sess. (1933), pp. 69-74 [hereinafter cited as 1933 Senate Hearings].
4. 1933 Senate Hearings, p. 96. However, the 1933 act adopted a policy of disclosure, 
whereas the state laws granted the government substantial powers to pass on the 
merits of securities offerings.
5. J. S. Ellenberger and E. P. Mahar, Legislative History of the Securities Act of 1933 
and Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (S. Hackensack, N.J.: Fred B. Rothman & Co., 
1973).
6. See P. Studenski and H. E. Kroos, Financial History of the United States (New York: 
McGraw-Hill, 1952), p. 382.
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a scheme which has one statute that heavily regulates disclosure when 
securities are issued (the 1933 act) and another statute, almost totally 
unconnected, that regulates the disclosure of information by public 
companies (the 1934 act).7 As a result of recommendations in the 
SEC’s “Wheat Report,” the SEC has reduced certain disclosure re­
quirements under the 1933 act while increasing 1934 act obligations.8 
In 1978, Congress will be asked to consider adoption of the American 
Law Institute’s Federal Securities Code, which would, in effect, inte­
grate the securities acts. The flexibility of the acts, as demonstrated by 
the SEC’s recent shift in emphasis, is also a factor that indicates the 
absence of strong, original congressional intent.
Securities analysts and economists have also criticized the se­
curities acts: They complain of the uselessness of some of the informa­
tion the SEC requires to be disclosed and of the SEC’s prohibition 
against disclosure of more relevant information. This criticism led to the 
formation in 1976 of the SEC’s Advisory Committee on Corporate Dis­
closures, which recently issued its report.
Congressional committees were informed in 1933 and 1934 that 
historical cost information might not be very useful to investors,9 but 
Congress did not attempt to understand the problem in depth nor try to 
solve it. Professor Homer Kripke has suggested a reason for this 
indifference in 1933-4: "There is no history showing that the persons 
responsible for the draftsmanship of the Securities Act of 1933 were 
experienced in securities selection or in the securities markets. . . .” 10 
Even the less subtle topic of the investor’s need for earnings state­
ments for three years, rather than earnings statements for just one 
year, had to be explained at the 1933 Senate hearings by a prominent 
accountant, but the senators were not overwhelmed by the account­
ant’s insight, as is described later in this chapter.11
7. The principal activating force for this criticism was an article by Milton Cohen, 
“ ‘Truth in Securities' Revisited,” Harvard Law Review 79 (1966): 1340. It should be 
noted that in his 1933 message to Congress regarding the 1933 act, President 
Roosevelt referred to his plans for a second securities act dealing with "all property 
dealt in on exchanges.” H. Rep. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st sess. (1933).
8. U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, Disclosure to Investors-A Reappraisal of 
Federal Administrative Policies Under the '33 and '34 Acts (New York: Commerce 
Clearing House, 1969).
9. See chap. 2, n. 23.
10. H. Kripke, "An Unusual Opportunity for Rethinking Concepts on a Fundamental 
Level,” New York Law Journal, December 13, 1976, p. 27, col. 2. For another 
description of the work of economists in this area, and its impact on the work of the 
SEC, see an address by Commissioner Sommer titled “Required Disclosure in the 
Stock Market: The Other Side," September 27, 1973, in Wiesen, Regulating Trans­
actions in Securities (St. Paul, Minn.: West Publishing Co., 1975), p. 311.
11. 1933 Senate Hearings, pp. 55-67.
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Congressional Consideration of the Role of Auditors 
Under the Securities Acts
The testimony of Colonel Carter, president of the New York State 
Society of Certified Public Accountants, before the Senate Banking and 
Currency Committee in 1933 was of great importance to public audi­
tors.12 He influenced Congress to abandon the idea of government 
auditors in favor of auditing by the private sector’s “public” auditors. 
The SEC, in an accounting series release (ASR), referred to Carter’s 
role at the hearings as that of “a representative of the accounting 
profession,” and stated that the Senate committee revised the bill in 
accordance with Carter’s “suggestions.” 13 In fact, the SEC implied that 
the committee was convinced by Carter’s persuasion, and persons 
generally recall the episode in that way.
In that ASR the SEC characterized Carter’s testimony at the 1933 
Senate hearings as part of a thorough investigation by the Senate 
committee of what the role of the auditor under the 1933 act would be:
The Committee considered at length the value to investors and to the 
public of an audit by accountants not connected with the company or 
management and whether the additional expense to industry of an audit by 
independent accountants was justified by the expected benefits to the 
public. The Committee also considered the advisability and feasibility of 
requiring the audit to be made by accountants on the staff of the agency 
administering the A ct.14
This statement belies that Senate committee’s lack of knowledge of, 
and its disinterest in, the work of auditors.
Carter’s testimony significantly influenced the Senate committee to 
change a major provision of the 1933 act, from requiring issuers of 
securities to be audited by government auditors to requiring those 
audits to be done by the private sector. That decision was made quite 
easily because the committee had not thoroughly explored the me­
chanics of the proposed government audit process, it did not possess 
a basic knowledge of public auditing, nor did it have a sophisticated 
understanding of the purposes of financial statements as displayed by 
Carter’s discussions on the need for three-year comparative financial 
statements.
The testimony that most pointedly displays the committee’s lack of 
knowledge about auditors’ work is the following:
Senator Gore: How many public accountants do you think would be 
available for this service?
12. Ibid.
13. U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, Independence of Certifying Accountants, 
ASR no. 81 (December 11, 1958), p. 1.
14. Ibid.
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Mr. Carter: There are approximately 15,000 certified public account­
ants in the United States today qualified under the laws of the various 
States:
Senator Barkley: How many in your organization?
Mr. Carter: Two thousand.
Senator Barkley: Is there any relationship between your organization 
with 2,000 members and the organization of controllers represented here 
yesterday with 2,000 members?
Mr. Carter: None at all. We audit the controllers.
Senator Barkley: You audit the controllers?
Mr. Carter: Yes; the public accountant audits the controller’s account.
Senator Barkley: Who audits you?
Mr. Carter: Our conscience.
Senator Barkley: I am wondering whether after all a controller is not 
for all practical purposes the same as an auditor, and must he not know 
something about auditing?
Mr. Carter: He is in the employ of the company. He is subject to the 
orders of his superiors.
Senator Barkley: I understand. But he has got to know something 
about auditing?
Mr. Carter: Yes.
Senator Barkley: He has got to know something about bookkeeping?
Mr. Carter: But he is not independent.
Senator Reynolds: Let me ask you this question, Colonel. These com­
panies are going to arrive at these figures through their special auditors. 
All right. Now you want the members of your organization to check up on 
their figures?
Mr. Carter: A s we do in many cases of industrial companies every 
year.15
Further questioning of Carter showed that some of the committee 
members were not absorbing all of his testimony. The committee had 
to be informed twice that 85 percent of New York Stock Exchange 
(NYSE) companies had independent audits.16 After the testimony 
quoted above, committee members repeated questions they had pre­
viously asked about the British Companies Act17 and the nature of the 
auditor's opinion in the United States.18
At the 1933 Senate hearings the committee also displayed a lack of 
patience with the subject of auditing. At one point the committee was 
engaged in a meaningful discussion of the purpose of having an 
independent audit, but the committee chairman stated: “ Let us pro­
ceed, Colonel Carter. We would like to get through with this.” 19 Carter’s 
testimony had at that point filled less than eight large-type pages, but 
had begun to develop very practical proposals about financial state­
ments and a discussion of the purposes of the bill. Carter obeyed the 
chairman’s directive: After one more page of testimony on the efficacy
15. 1933 Senate Hearings, p. 58.
16. Ibid., pp. 56, 60.
17. Ibid., pp. 57, 61-62.
18. Ibid., pp. 56-57, 59-60.
19. Ibid., p. 62.
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of financial statements, Carter left the topic and concluded his testi­
mony with a discussion of securities salesmen’s commissions.
The choice of that subject, to which Carter was directed by the 
committee, may be also indicative of the reason so little attention was 
placed on the work of auditors. Congress may have been more con­
cerned with the institutions directly involved with the functioning of the 
securities markets than it was in the quality of corporate disclosures. 
This relative degree of concern was displayed at another session of 
the 1933 Senate hearings, at which some senators had difficulty under­
standing why the 1933 act was so unrelated to stock exchange trans­
actions.20
At the 1934 Senate hearings, on the topic of the qualifications of 
auditors, Robert E. Healy, chief counsel of the Federal Trade Commis­
sion (FTC), testified that he “hope[d] the day [would] come” when 
accountants would be more strongly regulated by the federal govern­
ment. Senator Kean asked emphatically whether accountants ought to 
be licensed by the federal government. Healy began his brief answer 
by reminding the committee that he had already answered the ques­
tion, but "some of the committee were busy with something else.” He 
stated that it might be a good idea, and along with it, accountants 
should perhaps report to shareholders, rather than to directors, all of 
which might give accountants "a dignified position of responsibility 
under Federal laws.” Healy, in an attempt to provoke a response, 
suggested that the answer would be a matter of public and congres­
sional “ sentiment.” The chairman responded: “We have enough to deal 
with now without going into outside questions. The complaint about this 
bill is that it goes too far.”21
It is not too surprising that congressional consideration of auditing 
and auditors was not extensive concerning the 1934 act and the 1934 
amendments to the 1933 act. Congressional interest in the subject may 
have been dissipated when the 1933 act made accountants a specific 
target of liability and set the standard at mere negligence, as dis­
cussed below.
At the 1934 Senate hearings some congressmen showed that they 
had not absorbed the prior year’s testimony. For example, on the 
subject of audit costs, Senator Kean asked the same questions in 1934 
as he had asked in 1933; however, he did not question George O. 
May, a prominent spokesman for the accounting profession, in 1934 
why his answer differed significantly from Colonel Carter’s testimony in 
1933.22
20. Ibid., pp. 72-74.
21. U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Banking and Currency, Hearings on S. Res. 
84, and S. Res. 56, and S. Res. 97, 73d Cong., 2d sess. (1934), p. 7616 [hereinafter 
cited as 1934 Senate Hearings].
22. Compare 1933 Senate Hearings, p. 60, with 1934 Senate Hearings, p. 7182.
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The failure of Congress to be more informed about auditing might 
be attributed, in part, to the absence of a unified national organization 
of accountants. In 1933-4 there were two opposing professional 
groups, the American Society of Certified Public Accountants and the 
American Institute of Accountants (the AIA, now the AICPA). A weak 
institutional framework resulted from the competition between them.23 
However, the profession was represented by leading persons who 
submitted statements to, or testified before, Congress, including Colo­
nel Carter, representing the New York State Society of Certified Public 
Accountants; George O. May, on behalf of the AlA’s Special Commit­
tee on Cooperation with Stock Exchanges; and John L. Carey, who 
was secretary of the AIA.24
Congress could have been more informed on auditing by carefully 
studying national bank and railroad audits, and by studying auditing- 
related literature. The information which was available on auditing in 
1933-4 is described below. Furthermore, congressional committees 
could have examined various proposals that had been previously 
made in Congress regarding the federal licensing of auditors (de­
scribed in chapter 3).
Regulation by Disclosure
The securities acts, especially the 1933 act, represent a grand 
attempt at regulation by disclosure rather than by prohibition. As de­
scribed above, Congress was familiar with state “Blue Sky” laws which 
prohibited the sale of securities deemed to be unfair by an executive 
of the state government.
Congress appears to have been more conscious of choosing reg­
ulation by disclosure in 1933-4 than in the 1960s and 1970s when it has 
adopted disclosure as the method to regulate many types of business 
activities and conduct. A recent congressional bill, which became the 
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, was said to employ a novel 
regulatory approach because it prohibited certain activities rather than 
merely requiring them to be disclosed. The staff of the Senate Banking, 
Housing and Urban Affairs Committee stated in the report accompany­
ing the bill that they “carefully weighed” the arguments on both sides 
of “ prohibition vs. disclosure.”25
23. The "feud,” and its effects, are described throughout Chatov, “Corporate Financial 
Standards Regulations.”
24. The testimony of Carter and May is documented extensively in this paper. Carey’s 
statement is included in U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Interstate and For­
eign Commerce, Hearings on H.R. 7852 and H.R. 8720, 73d Cong., 2d sess. (1934), 
pp. 652-654.
25. See U.S., Congress, Senate, Congressional Record 122 (1976): 6977, regarding S. 
3418, 94th Cong., 2d sess. (1976).
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Congress rejected two direct methods of regulating auditing— em­
ployment of federal auditors and federal licensing of auditors. 
However, as discussed in chapter 2, Congress did not consider them 
extensively. Considered even more briefly was regulating “ . . . how 
[companies should] keep their books,”26 even though Congress had in 
fact authorized such close regulation of utilities and railroads prior to 
1933.27 In both of the securities acts, Congress delegated significant 
authority over auditors and auditing to the administrative agency that 
would supervise the act.
The State of Auditing in 1933-4
Independent auditing was in a period of transition in the early 
1930s, moving from relative unimportance and comparatively few writ­
ten rules, to becoming a requirement for public companies and a 
profession with some significant written guidelines. This development 
of auditing appears to have been more a result of the efforts of the 
NYSE, which began most earnestly in 1932, than the enactment of the 
securities acts, as described by SEC Commissioner Sommer in a 1974 
speech:
We are now in the midst of the third formal effort to develop in a systematic 
fashion a body of accounting principles. Prior to the commencement of the 
first such formal effort, there had been considerable discussion of the 
desirability of developing some systemization of accounting principles and 
auditing practices. This manifested itself in somewhat fragmentary fashion 
in bulletins issued by the Federal Reserve Bank in 1917 and 1929. Largely 
under the leadership of George O. May, then the managing partner of 
Price, Waterhouse & Co., liaison was established between the principal 
accounting organization and the New York Stock Exchange, the principal 
securities market in the United States, looking toward the development of 
accounting and auditing standards for companies listed on that Exchange. 
This eventuated in 1934 in a document entitled Audits o f Corporate Ac­
counts which unquestionably had profound impact upon the development 
of accounting principles. Given its origin, of course, this publication was 
strongly shareholder oriented. Among other things, this introduced the 
terms "accepted principles of accounting” and “ accounting principles,” 
established a standard form of auditing report and incorporated in it the 
term "present fairly” and eliminated the words “we certify” in favor of “ in 
our opinion.”28
26. 1933 Senate Hearings, p. 219 (discussion between Senator Byrnes and Mr. Healy; 
quoted statement is by the latter).
27. W. A. Staub, Auditing Developments During the Present Century (Cambridge, Mass.: 
Harvard University Press, 1942), pp. 15-25.
28. “The American Experience with Accounting Principles,” address by Commissioner 
A. A. Sommer, London, England, Dec. 11, 1974 (Washington, D.C.: Securities and 
Exchange Commission), pp. 1-2. The third effort to establish accounting principles 
referred to in the quote is the formation of the Financial Accounting Standards Board 
(FASB). Note that for the purposes of this paper Sommer is referring to auditing 
standards as much as to accounting principles. As described elsewhere, the FRB
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The fact that accounting and auditing were in a state of change in 
1933-4 makes it difficult to gauge congressional intent on the topic and 
suggests that Congress may have had difficulty focusing on this mov­
ing subject.
At the 1933 Senate hearings Colonel Carter depicted independent 
auditing as a profession that was ubiquitous, but, as noted above, 
congressmen seemed to have little understanding of the subject. 
Healy, who as chief counsel at the FTC was to have an important role 
in administering the 1933 act, revealed to Congress, without apology, 
his lack of knowledge of auditing:
The Chairman: Now, Judge Healy, suppose an independent auditing 
concern, a certified public accountant, were to submit to you a statement 
regarding one of these concerns that was applying for registration for the 
purpose of selling their securities, would that accounting concern take the 
books of the corporation, without going into the question of the value or 
the write-up or anything of that sort. Would they just confine themselves to 
the books of the company in making their statement?
Mr. Healy: It is very difficult for me to answer that question, of course, 
because I do not know what they do.29
Nine leading accounting firms, in a letter to the NYSE in 1933, implied 
that little was known about auditing:
We fully recognize the importance of defining the responsibility of 
auditors and of bringing about a proper understanding on the part of the 
investing public of the scope and significance of financial audits, to the 
end that their importance should not be underrated nor their protective 
value exaggerated in the minds of investors.30
This was a convenient argument to present to Congress in 1933-4 
as a reason for not imposing great liability on auditors. However, such 
disparagement of auditing was considered necessary by some ac­
countants because other contemporaries described auditing as a pre­
cise science, as is discussed in chapter 2. Of course, the public still 
has significant misconceptions about auditing.31
There is some evidence that in 1933-4 auditing was in a more 
highly developed state, and more was known about it, than the forego­
ing information reveals. This can be seen in W. A. Staub’s [managing
bulletin, Verification of Financial Statements ‘(Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government 
Printing Office, 1929), and the pamphlet Audits of Corporate Accounts (New York: 
AIA, 1934), were concerned with the rules of auditing.
29. 1933 Senate Hearings, p. 218.
30. This letter was printed in American Institute of Accountants, Audits of Corporate 
Accounts, which also contains the correspondence between the AlA's Special Com­
mittee on Cooperation with Stock Exchanges and the NYSE’s Committee on Stock 
List from 1932-1934.
31. For example, the Commission on Auditors’ Responsibilities found that many financial 
statement users have the erroneous conception “that the financial statements are the 
representations of the auditor rather than of management.” CAR, Report of Tentative 
Conclusions (New York: AICPA, 1977), p. 76.
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partner of Lybrand, Ross Bros. & Montgomery] description of the 
standardization process that auditing was undergoing for NYSE-listed 
companies before the NYSE-AIA collaboration began in 1932:
One of the most helpful influences in furthering the practice of having 
published financial statements accompanied by certificates of independent 
public accountants was that exerted by the New York Stock Exchange. As 
the culmination of informal activity in this direction for some years, the 
president of the Exchange on January 6, 1933, made an announcement 
that since April of 1932 all corporations applying for listing of their se­
curities had been asked to include in their listing agreements an undertak­
ing that future annual financial statements, published more than three 
months after the agreement, would be audited by independent public 
accountants and accompanied by a certificate of such accountants, setting 
forth the scope of the audit and qualifications, if any, made by them in 
respect thereto, and that the Committee on Stock List had considered 
many reasons advanced why this procedure should not apply in particular 
cases but had made exceptions only in the case of certain railroad com­
panies. . ..
Especially from the time that Mr. J. M. B. Hoxsey became executive 
assistant to the Stock List Committee of the Exchange during the 1920's, 
the Exchange had been doing its utmost to encourage the preparation of 
financial statements published by listed corporations on the basis of sound 
accounting principles. The support of the Exchange in this way, which 
antedated the enactment of the securities acts, was most helpful to ac­
countants in their efforts for improvement in corporate accounting practice. 
The services of Mr. Hoxsey, representing the Exchange, in accounting 
conferences with the officers of listed corporations, with the independent 
accountants examining the statements of such corporations, and with the 
Committee of the American Institute of Accountants on Cooperation with 
Stock Exchanges, were of the greatest value in furthering the recognition 
and adoption by corporations of sound accounting principles and the 
improvement in form and content of published statements (emphasis sup­
plied).32
Accounting historians provide additional reasons for characterizing 
auditing as being in a relatively developed state in 1933-4.33 They cite 
the quality of Robert H. Montgomery's formidable work Auditing Theory 
and Practice, first published in 1912, and in its fourth edition by 1933.34 
As further evidence that modern auditing was observable in the United 
States at the beginning of the twentieth century, historians cite publica­
tion in 1905 of Dicksee’s Auditing: A Practical Manual for Auditors 
(edited by Montgomery).35
32. Staub, Auditing Developments, pp. 14-15. President Whitney’s announcement on 
January 6, 1933, is contained in Audits of Corporate Accounts, p. 14.
33. In 1976 the author consulted Professors Richard Brief and Barbara Merino of the 
Schools of Business, New York University, and Professor Steven A. Zeff of the 
School of Business, Tulane University.
34. R. H. Montgomery, Auditing Theory and Practice (New York: Ronald Press, 1912). 
The second edition was published in 1923 and the third in 1927.
35. L. R. Dicksee, Auditing: A Practical Manual for Auditors, First American Ed., edited 
by R. H. Montgomery (New York: Ronald Press, 1905).
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It is difficult to reconcile the conflicting evidence about the state of 
the art of auditing in 1933-4 because of the absence of significant 
empirical evidence of what auditors were in fact doing. William Werntz, 
chief accountant at the SEC in the 1930s, made the following observa­
tion in 1939 about the difficulty in studying actual audit procedures:
In contrast to the time we [at the SEC] have spent on accounting princi­
ples, there have been few cases before us involving the question of 
whether a reasonable audit was made. This is perhaps due to lack of 
information, in the normal case, as to the audit procedure followed. The 
cases that do appear come to us after the horse had been spirited from 
the barn. . . .36
Even though most auditors had probably studied Montgomery’s 
auditing book, there is no evidence that accountants outside of 
Montgomery’s firm were following it in practice. The framework of 
auditing, as we know it, seems to have been present, but there was 
apparently significant variability in its application from firm to firm.37
Barr and Koch, high-ranking accountants with the SEC, analyzed 
the state of auditing in 1934 and reported that “ little authoritative 
literature existed which clearly indicated the type of auditing pro­
cedures normally employed by certifying accountants.”38 Their article 
cited the McKesson & Robbins case to support that observation. The 
SEC found in that 1939 case that physical inspection of inventories, 
and direct correspondence with debtors to confirm amounts reported 
as accounts receivable, were generally recommended and frequently 
employed, but they were not required procedures of the accounting 
profession.39 Staub, in the 1940 Dickinson lectures at Harvard, stated: 
“Although the confirmation practice was gradually coming into greater 
use, it certainly could not be said up to 1939 that it was an essential 
auditing procedure in the absence of which the auditor would not give 
an unqualified certificate.”40
As described above, the existence of two competing professional 
organizations of accountants in 1933-4 constituted a weak institutional 
framework. This also may have contributed to a lag between auditing 
theory and actual auditing practice. The absence of information about 
auditing practices hindered the profession’s spokesmen before Con­
36. W. W. Werntz, "What Is Expected of the Independent Auditor: From the viewpoint of 
the Investor,” an address delivered at the annual meeting of the American Institute 
of Accountants, September 21, 1939 (Washington, D.C.: Securities and Exchange 
Commission), p. 2.
37. This was the consensus opinion of the three accounting historians referred to in n. 
33 above.
38. Barr and Koch, "Accounting and the S.E.C.,” George Washington Law Review 28 
(1959): 186. Andrew Barr was the chief accountant at the SEC for many years. Elmer 
Koch was a financial accountant at the SEC at the time the article was written.
39. U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, In the Matter of McKesson & Robbins, 
ASR no. 19 (December 5, 1940), contained a summary of the SEC’s two-part report.
40. Staub, Auditing Developments, p. 52.
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gress and was detrimental to the ability of Congress to have specific 
expectations about auditor services.
Healy, speaking in 1937 as an SEC commissioner, reflected on the 
state of accounting and auditing after the securities acts were 
adopted:
I recall the advent of the Securities Act of 1933, the Securities Exchange 
Act of 1934, the creation of the Securities and Exchange Commission in 
1934, and the Public Utility Holding Company Act in 1935. I recall the 
writing of the forms and regulations for the registration of securities, the 
disappointments attending our search for well established accounting 
standards, the difficulty even of finding a definition for the word "audit,” the 
weeks of arguments as to what should be required in a form and what 
omitted, the difficulty of deciding what an accountant's certificate ought to 
contain, the cooperation and contributions of accountants, some with axes 
to grind and others without (emphasis on portions directly related to audit­
ing).41
Congressmen may have been in the same position as all U.S. 
citizens: According to a 1932 Fortune article, certified public account­
ants “walk in the shadow of virtual anonymity.”42
Congressional Expectations Regarding the SEC and the 
Accounting Profession
Congress may have adopted the securities acts without specific 
expectations about auditor duties because it relied on the SEC (or the 
FTC when it adopted the 1933 act) and the two professional associa­
tions of accountants (even though they were feuding) to develop ac­
counting and auditing requirements.
Landis, in a private communication, referred to the delegation of 
authority to the SEC in the following way: “We ought eventually to move 
toward some uniformity in accounting, but it will be obviously a long 
time before that can be done. . . .”43 Chatov’s research confirms this 
statement, although he is more concerned with accounting principles 
than with auditing standards:
What were the specific ideas in the minds of the creators of the [securities] 
Acts with respect to the treatment of accounting principles and setting up 
the rules for financial reporting? . . . Benjamin Cohen’s [another of the acts’ 
draftsmen] recollection of the event was that the ultimate idea was to get 
power into the Commission.
41. R. E. Healy, "The Next Step in Accounting," an address delivered at the annual 
meeting of the American Accounting Association (December 27, 1937), p. 2.
42. “Certified Public Accountants,” Fortune 5 (1932): 63.
43. Letter from Landis to Renn, March 26, 1934, on file with the James M. Landis 
Papers, Harvard Law Library.
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. . . Congress had given the new Commission extensive rulemaking au­
thority, rather than impose statutory requirements which would have been 
impossible to fulfill, since generally accepted principles of accounting were 
a myth rather than a reality.44
This analysis is supported by a dialogue at the 1933 Senate hearings 
between Huston Thompson and Senator Steiwer:
Senator Steiwer: . . .  I have just provided myself with the listing re­
quirements of the New York Stock Exchange, which I had not been familiar 
with, and apparently, from a superficial reading of their listing require­
ments, they are more far-reaching as to the information necessary to be 
furnished than the bill now presented to this committee.
Mr. Thompson: I might say that in a sense we were trying not to have 
this bill too long. I think it is only about 30 pages, while the British 
Companies Act is over 300 pages. But we do have a provision in the bill 
which permits the Commission to set up rules and regulations which will 
have the effect of law. In those rules and regulations we expect them, in 
drafting their forms, to go more into detail with regard to requirements.
Senator Steiwer: All r ig h t45
The extent to which Congress delegated authority over auditing to 
the SEC is a subject of some controversy.46 There is agreement that 
the SEC has indirect control over auditing because of its authority to 
(a) prescribe “ . . . the methods to be followed in the preparation of 
accounts” ;47 (b ) prevent false or misleading statements;48 and (c) re­
quire certain financial statements to be certified by independent public 
or certified accountants.49
44. Chatov, Corporate Financial Standards Regulations, pp. 183-184.
45. 1933 Senate Hearings, p. 72.
46. In the first place, there is a difference of emphasis in the way commentators 
approach the issue. Strother emphasizes that neither of the securities acts “express­
ly authorize[s] the Commission to prescribe the standards by which an independent 
public accountant is to conduct the examination underlying his report.” “The Estab­
lishment of Generally Accepted Accounting Principles and Generally Accepted Au­
diting Standards,” Vanderbilt Law Review 28 (1975): 224. The emphasis of 
Carmichael and Willingham is on the SEC’s power: “The SEC has the authority to 
make detailed prescriptions of accounting principles and auditing standards. . . .” 
(D. R. Carmichael and J. J. Willingham, Auditing Concepts and Methods, 2d ed. 
[New York: McGraw-Hill, 1975], p. 23). Secondly, it is presently unclear to what 
extent rule 2(e) of the SEC rules of practice permits the SEC to disqualify from 
appearing and practicing before it those accountants who do not possess the 
requisite qualifications. The rule is being challenged in Touche Ross & Co. v. SEC, 
76 Civ. 4489 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
47. Section 19(a), Securities Act of 1933 and section 13(b), Securities Exchange Act of 
1934. These sections also permit the SEC to prescribe “the form . . .  in which 
required information shall be set forth” and “the items or details to be shown in the 
balance sheet and earnings statement.. . . ”
48. The goal of full and fair disclosure is the crux of the 1933 act as stated in the act’s 
preamble and is the leading object of the various antifraud provisions of both the 
securities acts.
49. Securities Act of 1933, sched. A, items (25)-(26), and Securities Exchange Act of 
1934, secs. 12(b)(1)(J)-(K), 13(a)(2). Other provisions of the acts appear to grant the 
SEC the authority to define independence and to determine whether an auditor is 
independent.
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Confusion between Auditing and Accounting
It is difficult to assess some of the extrinsic evidence relevant to 
auditors' duties in 1933-4 because it simply refers to the rules and 
standards of accounting. The distinction between accounting principles 
and auditing standards appears to have been less clear then than it is 
today. The frequent use of the term accounting at congressional hear­
ings could indicate congressional indifference to specific auditor du­
ties, conscious assignment of that topic to a lesser status, or confusion 
between accounting and auditing. Staub, in a 1941 speech, described 
the subtlety of the distinction at that time:
Auditing has been sometimes described as the analytical phase of the 
accountant’s work and accounting per se as the synthetic phase. In prac­
tice the line between the two often becomes very dim; in fact, that line is 
frequently not apparent at all because of the overlapping of the two 
phases.50
Commentators in the 1930s indicated that accounting principles 
were of greater interest to the fledgling SEC than were matters con­
cerning auditing. Werntz, speaking in 1939, stated: “ It is perhaps true 
that the attention which events have directed toward standardizing 
accounting principles has resulted in less attention to audit prob­
lems.”51 Staub indicated that, after the McKesson & Robbins case in 
1940, the term “audit” was at the center of conversations about ac­
counting.52
Chatov claims that accountants helped Congress to confuse the 
distinction between accounting and auditing in order to aid their goal 
of keeping accounting and auditing rulemaking in the private sector. 
He characterizes the following description of the problem by John L. 
Carey as “somewhat generous” : “The accountants may have taken 
advantage of some of the confusion in . . .  the distinction between 
uniform accounting and standard audit requirements.”53
The Absence of Specific Funding by Congress
It has been argued that Congress evinced an original, and continu­
ing, policy against the SEC’s development of auditing standards by not 
having provided, or at least earmarked, sufficient funds for that pur­
50. Staub, Auditing Developments, p. 4.
51. W. W. Werntz, "What is Expected of the Independent Auditor," p. 7.
52. Staub, Auditing Developments, p. 5.
53. See e.g., Chatov, Corporate Financial Standards Regulations, p. 53, citing J. L. 
Carey, The Rise of the Accounting Profession, vol. 1 (New York: AICPA, 1969-70), p. 
133.
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pose.54 Also, prior to enactment of the securities acts, when Congress 
was considering requiring federal audits, it expected to fund them 
merely from registration fees, as is discussed in chapter 3.
Conclusion
Landis stated: "The experience of many years and of many nations 
is epitomized in the provisions of the Securities Act. . . . The Securities 
Act embodied little that was novel in conception, nor did it emanate 
from a Congress that for the first time had been called upon to 
consider the problem of security regulation.”55 However, as other 
draftsmen of the securities acts indicated, Congress did not consider 
extensively specific auditor duties:
. . . Many uncertainties remain— some necessarily so. May an accountant 
rely upon an appraiser’s certificate, where it does or where it does not 
contain qualifications? May he rely upon an officer’s certificate of inven­
tory? In a financial statement, what falls within the realm of fact, what within 
the realm of opinion?56
54. Chatov, Corporate Financial Standards Regulations, pp. 418-419.
55. J. M. Landis, “Liability Sections of Securities Act Authoritatively Discussed,” an 
address before the Eleventh Annual Fall Conference of the NYS Society of CPAs 
held in New York City, October 30, 1933, appearing in The American Accountant 18 
(1933): 330.
56. Douglas and Bates, “The Federal Securities Act of 1933,” Yale Law Journal 43
(1933): 198.
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2
General Congressional 
Expectations
High Expectations
Several of the specific congressional expectations discussed in 
chapter 3 indicate that Congress may have had high expectations of 
the services auditors would perform when it adopted the securities 
acts. General support for a high level of congressional expectations of 
auditors’ duties can be grouped into the categories that follow.
Reliance on Financial Statements
Section 11 of the 1933 act places greater responsibilities on ac­
countants for the accuracy of the financial statements in registration 
statements than it places on other “participants” in registered se­
curities offerings, other than the issuer.1 Accountants “expertise” sec­
tions of registration statements, unlike directors, underwriters, and 
officers who sign the registration statement. Participants (except the 
issuer) who are not “experts” do not need to "investigate” the “exper­
tised” parts of the registration statement. For example, directors and 
underwriters can rely on the auditors’ work to the extent that it leads to 
certification of the financial statements, if the nonexpert “has no rea­
sonable ground to believe and did not believe” that the statements 
were untrue.2
1. Section 11 refers to “accountants,” but the responsibilities generally pertain to 
auditors.
2. Section 11(b)(3)(C). As to accountants, the expertised part of a registration state­
ment is the certified financial statements. See Escott v. BarChris Construction Corp., 
283 F. Supp. 643 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
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This duty of “ negative assurance” placed on the nonexpert for the 
expertised parts of the registration statement was a result of congres­
sional amendment of section 11 in 1934. This amendment changed the 
provisions of the statute which had imposed a positive duty of “belief” 
in the truth of the statements. In 1934 Congress also changed the 
standard for review by nonexperts of nonexpertised parts of the regis­
tration statement from that of a “fiduciary” to that of a “prudent man in 
the management of his own property.”3
Professor Folk’s analysis of the legislative history of these changes 
was that “neither amendment intended or effected a change of sub­
stance.” Folk contended that the effect of the amendments on auditors’ 
responsibilities was clearly limited because a major reason for them 
was that "section 11 in its original form terrified the investment commu­
nity.”4 Still, any reduction of responsibility of nonexperts under section 
11, especially regarding the financial statements, can be viewed as an 
increase in the responsibility of experts to some degree.
Auditors must make a "reasonable investigation” of their expertised 
parts of 1933 act registration statements.5 This is formidable when 
compared to the British Companies Act. “Section 11 broke new ground 
by making experts liable for their misstatements; the English statutes 
did not incorporate this development until the Companies Act of 1948,” 
and “section 11 goes beyond the 1948 Act in specifically mandating a 
reasonable investigation by an expert and extending his liability to 
misleading omissions.”6
George O. May, senior partner of Price Waterhouse & Co. and a 
leading accounting spokesman in his role as chairman of an important 
AIA committee, characterized holding accountants liable for “untrue 
statements of a material fact” or omissions as an “unduly drastic 
measure” :
The question that should really be put to the accountant is not whether the 
balance sheet is true, but whether it is fair— fair in the accounting princi­
ples on which it is based; fair in the way in which those principles are 
applied to the facts; and fair in the way in which the results are presented. 
These are matters of opinion. . . .
. . .  Balance sheets, and profit and loss accounts are not, of course, 
covered in the form of statements of fact; but a description with an amount 
set opposite it is fairly capable of being judged as a statement of fact. The
3. Section 11(c).
4. Folk, “Civil Liabilities Under the Federal Securities Acts: The BarChris Case,” Virginia 
Law Review 55 (1969): pp. 18-19. A second part of the article appears in the same 
volume at pp. 199-271. Folk also states: “The present negative test of no reasonable 
ground was substituted in 1934 for the original affirmative standard of reasonable 
ground to believe, but this change was said to be only a concession to the terror 
psychology of the investment community” (Ibid., p. 28).
5. Section 11(b).
6. Folk, "Civil Liabilities Under the Federal Securities Acts,” pp. 14-16.
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common heading: “ Land, buildings, plant and machinery, at cost,” with a 
figure set opposite, seems at first blush to be a simple statement of fact; 
but in practice, what is fairly to be regarded as cost will often be a difficult 
matter of opinion, and always the question remains whether any, and if so, 
what amplification of the heading is necessary to make the statement not 
misleading.7
May directly informed Congress that accounting, including the auditing 
process, involved “matters of opinion,” as discussed below. These 
remarks somewhat tempered congressional expectations of auditors’ 
duties vis-à-vis other participants in the issuance of securities.
Expectations of Investors
Carter’s and May’s statements to Congress, that financial state­
ments were matters of opinion, were factors that evidence low con­
gressional expectations of auditors’ duties. However, Carter and May 
also informed Congress that the public was not fully aware of this fact 
about accounting and believed financial statements, especially when 
accompanied by an auditor’s report, offered greater protection than 
was possible.
Carter stated the following at the 1933 Senate hearings: “ I think the 
impression generally prevails that one who reads a balance sheet and 
an income statement regards the figures in such a statement as a 
defensible definitely ascertainable fact. . . .”8 Carter then reiterated the 
point: “ Investors are too prone to regard balance sheets and income 
accounts as positive and indisputable statements of fact. . . .”9 Also, as 
discussed below, congressmen and others spoke with high esteem of 
the work of the large accounting firms.
These assertions might seem unrealistic in light of the market crash 
four years earlier. However, the public apparently realized that frenzied 
speculation had been a major factor of inflated securities prices.10
Congress may have intended that required auditor performance be 
set by the courts at the level of investor expectations in 1933-4, which 
was high, or at a lower “floating” level if the profession was better able 
to explain to investors the limitations of its work (which, apparently, it 
still has not). The Conclusion of this study further explores the pos­
sibility that Congress had a “flexible” intent regarding auditors’ duties 
and discusses the permissibility of such unspecific legislative intent.
7. G. O. May, Twenty-five Years of Accounting Responsibility: 1911-36, vol. 2 (New 
York: American Institute Publishing Co., 1936), pp. 81-83. The quote comes from an 
address by May before the Illinois Society of Certified Public Accountants in Chi­
cago, III. on December 6, 1933, and also appears in Journal of Accountancy 57
(1934): 9-23,
8. U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Banking and Currency, Hearings on S. 875, 
73d Cong., 1st sess. (1933), p. 56 [hereinafter cited as 1933 Senate Hearings].
9. Ibid., p. 62.
10. G. Previts and B. Merino, Accounting in America, chap. 6 (publication forthcoming).
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Expectations Regarding the SEC and the Accounting Profession
The SEC’s statutory authority over auditing has been discussed in 
chapter 1. Congress may have had high expectations of auditors’ 
duties by creating the SEC. Chatov quotes Frankfurter as stating that 
“ the evolution of model financial accounting methods, with which the 
Commission is now charged, is well calculated to have far-reaching 
beneficial effects on American corporate practices.” 11 Chatov asserts 
that Frankfurter led Congress to believe that the SEC would develop 
extensive accounting rules.12
Congress might have expected that even if the SEC did not pro­
mulgate “model financial accounting methods,” the private sector 
would. As shown above, by 1933 the AIA had made some progress in 
that direction in collaboration with the NYSE.
Furthermore, the SEC’s review of registration statements and other 
filed documents (even for limited purposes), and the greater dis­
semination of financial statements pursuant to the new acts, could 
have been expected to provide the empirical data that were necessary 
for the creation of auditing standards by the SEC or the private sector. 
George Cochrane, a partner of Haskins & Sells, in a 1950 speech to 
the Institute of Chartered Accountants in England, described this effect 
of disclosures that resulted from the passage of the securities acts: 
“Consideration by the commission’s staff, of the accounting principles 
used by companies filing reports and of the audit procedures under­
taken by the independent accountant in such cases, has led to a much 
wider knowledge of what is and is not being done by corporations and 
accountants.” 13
Advancement in Auditing Techniques
The rapidly developing state of auditing in 1933-4 was described in 
chapter 1. There does not appear to be any evidence that Congress 
anticipated a significant increase in the complexity of business. There­
fore, Congress could have deduced that greatly improved auditing 
services were inevitable.
In the 1880s the first “chartered” accountants from Great Britain 
arrived in the United States.14 A Fortune article observed that the great
11. R. Chatov, “The Collapse of Corporate Financial Standards Regulations: A Study of 
SEC-Accountant Interaction” (Ph.D. Dissertation, University of California, Berkeley, 
1973), p. 193. The dissertation in a slightly edited form has been published under 
the title Corporate Financial Reporting: Public or Private Control (New York: Free 
Press, 1975). Chatov relies on a September, 1934, Fortune article, which cannot be 
located as cited.
12. Id.
13. G. Cochrane, “The Auditor’s Report: Its Evolution in the U.S.A.," The Accountant 123 
(1950): 448-460.
14. Previts and Merino, Accounting in America, chap. 3. The authors note that there 
were public accountants in the United States in the 18th century; but, not until the 
British chartered accountants arrived was there a “ recognized” professional group.
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progress in public accounting by 1932 had occurred in those mere fifty 
years.15 Staub, drawing from his professional experience, also de­
scribed the significant development of auditing in that period.16 While 
Congress was considering the securities act, the NYSE imposed a 
requirement that the scope of audits be as extensive as those required 
for loans by nonlisted companies in the 1929 version of the Federal 
Reserve Board (FRB) Bulletin, Verification of Financial Statements, and 
the new accountant’s report designed by the NYSE immediately filtered 
down to other companies.17
Low Expectations
Business was less complex, and auditing less sophisticated, in 
1933-4 than it is today. Therefore, it might be contended that Congress 
had low expectations of auditor duties. However, the following two 
topics, presented to Congress in 1933-4, lend greater support to that 
proposition.
Disparagement of Accounting and Auditing
When Congress was informed that accounting was a profession 
concerned merely with “opinions,” it may have expected that auditing 
would develop little. May submitted the following memorandum to Con­
gress in 1933:
In so far as accounting information is concerned, it seems to me funda­
mentally important to recognize that the accounts of a modern business 
are not entirely statements of fact, but are, to a large extent, expressions of 
opinion based partly on accounting conventions, partly on assumptions, 
explicit or implicit, and partly on judgment (emphasis supplied).18
May indicated that one of the main draftsmen of the 1933 act under­
stood this point. In a letter to Landis in 1933, May wrote:
I was particularly pleased to note your recognition of the undoubted fact 
that accounts are expressions of opinions. This seems to me to be the only 
sound starting point for any regulations relating to accounts or account­
ants. I agree with you that, in the past, efforts have frequently been made 
to represent accounts as being statements of fact to a greater extent than 
they can possibly be, and no doubt accountants must assume a part of the 
responsibility. However, some accountants, including myself, have for 
years been very insistent on the opposite view, and I think that academic 
authorities have had more influence than accountants.19
15. “Certified Public Accountants,” Fortune 5 (1932): 95.
16. W. A. Staub, Auditing Developments During the Present Century (Cambridge, Mass.: 
Harvard University Press, 1942), particularly at pp. 9-15.
17. Cochrane, “The Auditor’s Report,” pp. 452-453.
18. “ Memorandum Regarding Securities Bill-H.R. 4314 (1933),” in May, Twenty-five 
Years, vol. 2, p. 49.
19. Letter to the Hon. James M. Landis, November 2, 1933, in May, Twenty-five Years, 
vol. 2, p. 64.
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Colonel Carter emphasized at the 1933 Senate hearings that the 
auditor’s report accompanying financial statements only contained an 
opinion: “ [An opinion] is all [independent accountants] can give; that is 
all they can give. That is all anyone can give as to a balance sheet.”20 
Carter objected to a provision in the proposed 1933 act that the 
financial statements had to be sworn to as being correct: “ I do not see 
that anyone can certify under oath that a balance sheet giving many 
millions of dollars of assets is as a matter of fact correct. He can state 
his opinion based upon a thorough investigation.”21 Furthermore, one 
of Carter’s principal arguments against audits by federal employees 
was that government involvement with financial statements would in­
crease the public’s reliance on the information.22
Carter’s warnings to Congress about financial statements were 
aimed more directly at the limitations of auditing, while the criticisms of 
financial statements by most other persons were directed toward the 
shortcomings of accounting principles. Healy of the FTC, in congres­
sional testimony, pointed out that financial statements failed to reflect 
the effects of inflation.23 May, in a letter to Colonel M. C. Rorty in 1933, 
also stated a concern about financial statements that is still with us—  
their usefulness to investors:
The investor who actually relies on specific statements in a prospectus is a 
comparatively rare bird. Subscriptions to new securities from such sources 
would not supply a fraction of the needs of the country. The great bulk of 
the subscriptions come from persons who rely on more general considera­
tions, such as their belief in the issuer or in the underwriter.24
One of the reasons for these defensive statements by Carter and 
May could have been to offset the view of those laypersons and 
accounting spokesmen, such as Professor Ripley of Harvard, who 
spoke of financial statements as a product of a precise science. Carter 
and May seemed to have the floor regarding this issue at the hearings 
on the securities acts because the other point of view appears not to 
have been presented by the profession.
Congress may have disregarded the disparagement of auditors 
because (a) many investors did rely on financial statements, and the 
securities acts would encourage greater reliance; (b) accounting, more 
than auditing, was being attacked; and (c) the critics of financial 
statements, then as now, recognized their value for interperiod, and 
intercompany, comparisons.
It is interesting to note that in 1931 the auditor’s report was revised 
in an effort to reduce user reliance. As described by the AIA: “Ac­
20. 1933 Senate Hearings, p. 57.
21. Id.
22. Ibid., 55-63.
23. Ibid., 216-219.
24. May, Twenty-five Years, vol. 2, p. 60.
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countants therefore, by again changing the wording of their reports, 
endeavored to make clear that the report was an opinion and not a 
guarantee. The word ‘certify’ was eliminated and words indicating 
agreement with the books were removed.”25 Notwithstanding, Con­
gress still included the word “certified” in the securities acts.26 It is 
difficult to draw conclusions about congressional intent from these 
facts because even Colonel Carter did not adopt the new terminology 
at the 1933 Senate hearings: “ I do not see how the Federal Trade 
Commission can properly discharge its duty by merely accepting a 
statement that has not been independently examined and certified to 
by an accountant.”27
Rejection of Federal Auditors and the Federal Licensing of Public 
Auditors
The federal government had some experience with “federal audits” 
prior to 1933 through national bank examinations and uniform reports 
required in the railroad industry. They were not very effective and 
apparently were not examined at the 1933 hearings.
The rejection of audits by government employees of corporate 
issuers leads at first to the conclusion that Congress lowered investors’ 
reliance on the auditing process. However, persons who knew that 
Colonel Carter had a strong influence on the 1933 Senate hearings 
typically reached the opposite conclusion, that Congress was prom­
ised that public accountants would perform at a high level. For exam­
ple, A. A. Sommer, when he was an SEC commissioner, stated:
It [Congress] considered [in 1933] requiring that the accounts of publicly 
held companies be audited by a corps of federally employed accountants. 
Only the earnest importunings of the [accounting] profession and as­
surances of its adequacy to do a satisfactory job impelled Congress to 
forego this proposal.28
However, a close examination of the 1933 Senate hearings indicates 
that an assessment of Carter’s “assurances” to Congress is a more 
complex issue.
As discussed in chapter 1, Carter’s testimony did promise substan­
tial auditor performance because he wanted Congress to rely on a 
profession that it was not very familiar with and did not hold in very 
high esteem. He began his testimony by implicitly complimenting the 
work of independent accountants. Carter recommended that the pro­
25. Letter from the AIA to the NYSE, December 21, 1933, in Audits of Corporate 
Accounts (New York: AIA, 1934), p. 28.
26. Securities Act of 1933, sched. A, items (25)-(26), and Securities Exchange Act of 
1934, secs. 12(b)(1)(J)-(K), 13(a)(2).
27. 1933 Senate Hearings, p. 56.
28. "The SEC and the FASB: Their Roles,” an address by then SEC Commissioner A. A. 
Sommer, January 21, 1974, reprinted in Wiesen, Regulating Transactions in Se­
curities (St. Paul, Minn.: West Publishing Co., 1975), p. 273.
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posed 1933 act “ be changed so as to afford even greater protection to 
the investor than it now contemplates.”29 In a preamble to his inde­
pendent accountant proposal, Carter characterized FTC review of fi­
nancial statements as placing “a burden of proof” on the FTC “ rather 
than upon the issuer to develop full and reliable information.”30 Carter 
thereby suggested that Congress could have confidence in the re­
sponse which issuers and public auditors would make to the require­
ment of independent audits.
Then, and throughout much of his testimony, Carter denigrated the 
quality of the work that Congress could expect of government auditors 
on each occasion on which he complimented the work of his inde­
pendent profession. He stated that auditing of issuers was “an imprac­
tical thing for the Government agency to do . . . effectively.”31 Carter 
gave the following answers to the senators’ questions about whether 
the agency supervising the act ought to perform an audit after the 
independent accountant’s audit, if the proposed 1933 act were 
changed to require independent audits:
Senator Reynolds: All right. Then it goes to the Commission, does it 
not?
Mr. Carter: Yes.
Senator Reynolds: Have they got to check their accounts and your 
accounts?
Mr. C arte r: I do not think so. I do not think they would have to go to
that.
Senator Reynolds: Why should your members ask that they be permit­
ted and empowered to check these accounts?
Mr. C arte r: Because it is generally regarded that an independent audit 
of any business is a good thing.
Senator Reynolds: All right. Then, after it goes to the Commission they 
have to check up to see who is right; they have to go through and audit 
again. There has to be a Government audit, as suggested by Senator 
Barkley. Would it not be creating more difficulty and more expense and 
more time for the Government if auditing organizations interest themselves 
in these various and sundry corporations?
Mr. C arte r: I do not think so. I think if a corporation wished to issue 
some securities and had been employing independent public accountants 
for 20 years those accountants should be able to make this examination 
more economically and quickly than the Government.
Senator Reynolds: Could they do it more economically than the Gov­
ernment?
Mr. Carter: I think so.
Senator Gore: There would not be any doubt about that.
Senator Reynolds: Why?
29. 1933 Senate Hearings, p. 55. Carter seemed to apply that statement to all of his 
proposals, including the abandonment of government audits, even though that 
change was not the first one Carter discussed.
30. Id.
31. Ibid., p. 57.
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Mr. C arte r: We know the conditions of the accounts; we know the 
ramifications of the business; we know the pitfalls of the accounting struc­
ture that .the company maintains. You have got every kind of business to 
deal with.32
Thus, Carter implied at the 1933 Senate hearings that federal auditors 
would not be sufficiently experienced to audit an issuer within a rea­
sonable time and cost limit and with a reasonable level of expertise.
The limited congressional preparation for federal auditing is another 
reason that it is not possible to conclude that the rejection of federal 
auditors displayed a high level of congressional expectations of public 
auditors. This is evident in the following dialogue with Carter:
Senator Reynolds: Suppose that we decide in the final passage of this 
bill here to employ five or six hundred auditors from your organization, that 
would be all right, then, would it not?
Mr. Carter: I do not think the Government could employ five or six 
hundred independent accountants.
Senator Reynolds: Why could they not?
Mr. Carter: I do not think the type of men that are in the public 
practice of accountancy would leave their present practice to go in the 
Government employ.
Senator Reynolds: Well, if it were sufficiently remunerative they would?
Mr. C arte r: Yes; if the Government made their time worth while.
Senator Reynolds: The bill here provides for taking care of the ex­
penses incident thereto by way of registration.
Mr. C arte r: Well, you will have to build some more buildings in Wash­
ington to house them if you are going to do that.
Senator Reynolds: Then we had better not pass this bill at all.33
It cannot be determined whether Senator Reynolds was being face­
tious in his reference to new government buildings for auditors in 
Washington because of the limited thought that had been given to the 
establishment of a corps of government auditors.
In sum, Carter argued that independent, public auditors would be 
preferable to government auditors, but his conclusion was based on a 
low appraisal of what government auditors could accomplish.
The fact that Congress planned to pay the government auditors 
through registration fees also supports low congressional expectations 
of the work of federal auditors. Even comparing these funds to the 
small independent auditing fees for small issuers, as described by 
Carter in chapter 3 (“Cost Constraints” section), would have revealed 
that only very limited audits could have been performed. This was 
especially the case if the other costs of supervising the 1933 act would 
have had to have been paid by the registration fees.
Congress may not have realized this problem of funding federal 
audits because it did not consider the scope of the FTC’s initial
32. Ibid., pp. 58-59.
33. Ibid., p. 59.
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examination of an issuer’s financial statements, nor the circumstances 
which would have required a more intensive examination. In an ex­
change between Carter and Ferdinand Pecora, counsel at the 1933 
Senate hearings, it appears that Pecora contemplated a higher stand­
ard for FTC “ re-examination” of a registration statement prior to regis­
tration cancellation than did Carter.34 The absence of substantial 
congressional consideration of this subject is further evidence that 
Congress did not have high expectations of auditors’ duties.
Although Carter began his testimony at the 1933 Senate hearings 
by complimenting the work of independent auditors, he was more 
restrained in the balance of his testimony. As described above, Carter 
warned that financial statements and the accompanying auditor’s re­
port were statements of opinion. He did not shirk the accounting 
profession’s responsibility for some of the “debacle” in the securities 
markets, giving the following bland response to a question on that 
subject: “You still have some very sound companies and industries in 
this country.”35 Carter did not assert that accountants had a great 
interest in auditing— “the detail work of auditing is usually done by a 
subordinate”— nor did he promise fixed guidelines on auditing.36 Once 
congressmen realized how little they knew about auditing, independent 
auditors, and government auditors, Carter did not have to pressure 
them to abandon proposed federal audits.
In contrast to the issue of competence, the independence of audi­
tors was not focused upon at the 1933 Senate hearings, even though a 
corps of federal auditors would have avoided issuers’ directly paying 
auditors.
The failure of Congress to adopt federal licensing of auditors sug­
gests, on balance, low congressional expectations of auditor perform­
ance, since, as seen in chapter 3 (“Auditor Competence” section), the 
states were not uniformly effective in regulating the profession through 
licensing. Furthermore, proposals for the federal licensing of auditors 
were not new in 1933. As early as 1899, John A. Cooper, a prominent 
CPA, proposed a national system of registering accountants.37 A dec­
ade later, Edward N. Hurley, chairman of the FTC, made similar pro­
posals, which were opposed by the AIA.38
The licensing issue is discussed in chapter 3 as it relates to the 
competence of auditors. Other specific congressional expectations dis­
cussed in that chapter evidence limited expectations of auditors’ du­
ties, particularly cost constraints on audits.
34. Ibid., p. 63.
35. Ibid., p. 60.
36. Ibid., p. 61.
37. Speech before Illinois Association of Public Accountants, Chicago, Dec. 12, 1899, in 
The Accountant 29 (1903): 1251-53 and 1508.
38. “Registration of Accountants,” Journal of Accountancy 23 (1917): 185-89.
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3
Specific Congressional 
Expectations
Responsibility for Accurate Financial Statements
Auditors vis-à-vis Management
The chairman of the 1933 Senate hearings made the following 
analysis of management’s duty to provide accurate financial state­
ments under the 1933 act:
I do not see why the company should not be responsible, because the 
people it employs to check up inventories, and all that sort of thing . . . 
must know about [these things], and they must not be misleading so as to 
cause loss.1
This statement seems to indicate that Congress was relying more on 
management than auditors to discover errors in the reporting of inven­
tories and “ that sort of thing.” However, that observation must be 
tempered by the fact that the chairman’s statement was made in the 
context of defending the shared responsibility for false statements 
between the company and others in sections 11 and 12 of the 1933 
act.2 A discussion of liability under the 1933 act was presented in 
chapter 2.
Similarly, it would be incorrect to base speculation about congres­
sional expectations of auditors vis-à-vis management on Carter’s dis­
1. U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Banking and Currency, Hearings on S. 875, 
73d Cong., 1st sess. (1933), p. 210 [hereinafter cited as 1933 Senate Hearings].
2. Ibid., pp. 208-211.
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suading Congress from requiring an officer of an issuer to “verify under 
oath . . . that the statements, exhibits, and documents are correct.”3 
Carter attacked this provision on the basis that neither management 
nor auditors could make this promise about financial information, nor 
would investors benefit from it.4 On balance, Carter’s testimony at the
1933 Senate hearings emphasized the responsibility of management as 
compared to that of auditors:
[The auditor's opinion] can only be an opinion based upon certain ac­
counting assumptions which must be applied to the opinion of some 
individual as to values.5
A self-serving statement from the accounting profession about the 
primary role of management in financial reporting may have come to 
the attention of Congress. In the letter by nine leading accounting firms 
to the president of the NYSE on February 24, 1933, the accounting 
firms stated:
We think it well to . . . emphasize the fact that accounts must necessarily 
be largely expressions of judgment, and that the primary responsibility for 
forming these judgments must rest on the management of the corporation. 
And though the auditor must assume the duty of expressing his dissent 
through a qualification in his report, or otherwise, if the conclusions 
reached by the management are in his opinion manifestly unsound, he 
does not undertake in practice, and should not, we think, be expected to 
substitute his judgment for that of the management when the difference is 
not of major importance, when the management’s judgment is not unrea­
sonable and when he has no reason to question its good faith.6
The search for specific congressional intent on the relative roles of 
management and auditor prior to, or at the time of, enactment of the 
securities acts is shown to be difficult when one reconsiders the 
following statement by one of the principal draftsmen of the 1933 act:
Many uncertainties remain— some necessarily so. May an accountant rely 
upon an appraiser’s certificate, where it does or where it does not contain 
qualifications? May he rely upon an officer’s certificate of inventory? In a 
financial statement, what falls within the realm of fact, what within the realm 
of opinion?7
However, the post-enactment history of the securities acts may be 
instructive about congressional intent. Staub, in a 1941 speech, de­
scribed the SEC’s lack of involvement with auditing matters:
3. Ibid., pp. 57 and 62.
4. Ibid., p. 62. In this testimony, Carter stated that the oath could be given by issuers if 
it was in terms of “the best of his knowledge and belief.”
5. Ibid., p. 56.
6. American Institute of Accountants, Audits of Corporate Accounts (New York: AIA, 
1934), p. 25.
7. Douglas and Bates, ‘‘The Federal Securities Act of 1933,” Yale Law Journal 43
(1933): 198.
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It is significant that in the course of the seven years during which the 
Securities and Exchange Commission has been reviewing the registration 
statements filed with it under the Securities Act (security issues) and the 
Securities Exchange Act (security listings and corporate annual reports) 
the questions which the Commission has raised regarding financial state­
ments have in only a few instances been the result of financial irregularities 
as such but have dealt largely with the propriety or otherwise of the 
application of accounting principles to various circumstances and trans­
actions of the registrants.8
The SEC initially emphasized that the accuracy of financial state­
ments was the primary responsibility of management. Barr and Koch 
suggested that as a reason why the SEC in its early years failed to 
bring many cases against auditors or to establish extensive auditing 
requirements:
Of special significance was the Interstate Hosiery Mills case in which the 
Commission set forth its views as to the relative responsibility of a regis­
trant and its management and a certifying accountant in assuring the 
accuracy of financial statements. The Commission stated in its decision 
that the fundamental and primary responsibility for the accuracy of informa­
tion filed with the Commission rests upon management, and the employ­
ment of independent public accountants, however reputable, is not a 
substitution for management’s accounting of its stewardship but instead, 
serves as a check on that accounting.9
Many years later the SEC expressed the same position in addressing 
the independence of accountants: ‘‘The financial statements are the 
responsibility of the client and all decisions with respect to them must 
ultimately be assumed by the client.” 10
The SEC’s first involvement with financial statement problems not 
only emphasized management’s responsibility, but also, according to a 
commentator, required only auditor disclosure of financial statement 
deficiencies:
From these and other cases it is apparent that the Commission is willing to 
pass financial statements which may be deficient in setting forth accepted 
accounting practice provided the certifying accountant clearly points out 
the deficiency and states what the effect would be had more acceptable 
practice been followed. Its reasoning for this treatment results from the fact 
that it is administering a disclosure rather than a regulatory act and that a 
statement from the accountants concerning the accounting practice of the 
registrant gives a better picture of the managerial policy of the company 
than if the independent accountant were to revise the registrant’s balance
8. W. A. Staub, Auditing Developments During the Present Century (Cambridge, Mass.: 
Harvard University Press, 1942), p. 91.
9. Barr and Koch, “Accounting and the S.E.C.," George Washington Law Review 28 
(1959): 187.
10. U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, Independence of Accountants, ASR no. 
126 (July 5, 1972), p. 3.
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sheet and income statement to reflect more generally accepted principles 
and practices.11
This statement appears to apply to auditing problems, as well as to 
the choice of accounting principles. As stated above, a fine line sepa­
rates the two aspects of accounting, and this was more so in the 1930s 
than it is today.
Auditors vis-à-vis Directors
Arthur Andersen, writing in 1935, described a limited role for audi­
tors vis-à-vis directors:
The [lay person] must realize that the determination of the value at which 
assets of a corporation are stated in its accounts is a function of the board 
of directors. It is the function of the accountant to describe the basis of 
stating such values.12
This statement is also relevant to the previous discussion of the com­
parative duties of management vis-à-vis auditors. In this subsection, 
the principal issue is the role of nonmanagement (outside) directors in 
reviewing financial statements.
The provisions of section 11 of the 1933 act have been discussed 
above, along with the significant and relevant changes adopted in 
1934. The emphasis there was on the high congressional expectations 
of auditor duties that may have resulted from the possibly limited 
“ review” role planned for directors.
The case for imposing significant responsibilities on directors was 
made at committee hearings in 1933. A House committee was informed 
that the British law allowed directors to rely upon, among other things, 
“the statements of certified public accountants with respect to the 
financial affairs of the company, of experts with respect to certain 
values of property carried in the balance sheet, of the public account­
ants and the president and officers with respect to accounts and bills 
receivable and their estimate of whether they are good.” 13 The same 
point was made at the 1933 Senate hearings by Ollie M. Butler, an 
attorney for the Department of Commerce and one of the draftsmen of 
the 1933 act, who testified: “ [Director reliance] is possible under the
11. A. Smith, “Accounting Practice Under the Securities and Exchange Commission,” 
The Accounting Review 10 (1935): 331. In 1938, the SEC made it clear that the use 
of accounting principles “for which there is no substantial authoritative support,” will 
be presumed to be misleading despite disclosure (U.S. Securities and Exchange 
Commission, Administrative Policy on Financial Statements, ASR no. 4, [April 25, 
1938]).
12. Andersen, “Present-day Problems Affecting the Presentation and Interpretation of 
Financial Statements,” Journal of Accountancy 60 (1935): 334.
13. U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, Hearings 
on H.R. 4314, 73d Cong., 1st sess. (1933), p. 169 [hereinafter cited as 1933 House 
Hearings].
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British system of government, where the central government has abso­
lute control over [auditors and other] experts, and can demand certain 
requirements of them.” 14 He described as “not so adequate” the “qual­
ification” legislation regarding accountants in some states, and con­
cluded that “to excuse the directors for a misstatement based on the 
report of some auditors or certified accountants Would practically nullify 
the strength of the responsibility [of directors] provision [of section 11 
of the 1933 act].” 15 Similarly, a Senate Banking and Currency Commit­
tee report accompanying the proposed 1933 act stated: “ If a director 
can excuse himself by saying that he has in good faith relied upon an 
accountant’s statement . . . .  then the investor will continue in the same 
position from which the nation is struggling to extricate him.” 16
Further evidence that Congress set high expectations for directors 
vis-à-vis auditors was the fact that, as Butler reported to Congress, the 
attack on the proposed 1933 act was “ being made chiefly against the 
responsibility of directors and the revocation [of registration] clauses of 
the bill.” 17 As described in chapter 2 in the section on “Reliance on 
Financial Statements,” Congress assisted directors in 1934 by enacting 
two amendments to the 1933 act. However, Folk observed that “ neither 
amendment intended or effected a change of substance.” 18
There are factors, however, which indicate lower expectations of 
directors. As observed in chapter 2, in 1933 Congress set greater 
responsibilities for U.S. auditors than were required of their British 
counterparts. Furthermore, at the 1933 Senate hearings the time limita­
tions of outside directors were discussed. One senator observed that 
directors lacked the ability to “verify every figure which was in their 
annual statement or prospectus.” 19 Another senator suggested, as a 
solution to this problem, that an auditor ought to be criminally liable for 
any false statement in his report, even if it arose from only gross 
negligence. He stated: “You would be reaching the source in that 
case.”20 Mr. Breed, counsel to a tristate investment bankers associa­
tion, posed the following rhetorical question to the senators discussing 
this topic:
Which of you gentlemen who sits on a corporation’s board of directors, 
which has a list of accounts receivable, can physically possibly go over 
every one of a thousand and in some cases it may be tens of thousands of
14. 1933 Senate Hearings, p. 247.
15. Id.
16. U.S., Congress, Senate, S. Rep. no. 47, 73d Cong., 1st sess. (1933), p. 5.
17. 1933 Senate Hearings, p. 248.
18. Folk, "Civil Liabilities Under the Federal Securities Acts: The BarChris Case,” Virginia 
Law Review 55 (1969): 18-19. A second part of the article appears in the same 
volume at pp. 199-271.
19. 1933 Senate Hearings, p. 209.
20. Id.
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items of accounts due from all over the United States and the world, and 
guarantee that every one of those are worth 100 percent on the dollar?21
Additional evidence of both high and low congressional expecta­
tions of director responsibilities is presented below in the sections on 
auditor and auditing firm competence. The most conclusive and proba­
bly most important point to note from the allocation of responsibilities 
between directors and auditors is that Congress was concerned about 
the balance between the two. The importance of this observation is 
discussed in this study’s Conclusion.
Employee Defalcations
As stated in chapter 2, the NYSE’s 1933 announcement requiring 
independent audits stipulated that the scope of the audit be no less 
than that indicated in the 1929 FRB Bulletin titled “Verification of Finan­
cial Statements.” The bulletin stated: ‘‘The scope of the work indicated 
in these instructions includes . . .  an examination of the accounting 
system for the purpose of ascertaining the effectiveness of the internal 
check.”22 It was the NYSE’s understanding that the bulletin “clearly 
indicated that the scope of the examination therein provided for was 
not such as would lead naturally to detection of . . . defalcations on the 
part of employees. . . .”23 Similarly, the 1933 reply of the nine leading 
public accounting firms to a request for information by the NYSE 
confirmed that audits, especially of large companies such as those on 
the NYSE, would not "naturally” detect employee defalcations. The 
letter stated: “Such companies rely on an adequate system of internal 
check to prevent or disclose defalcations, and independent account­
ants making a financial examination do not attempt to duplicate the 
work of the internal auditors.”24 The following statement in the report of 
the NYSE’s Committee on Stock List to the exchange’s governing 
committee agreed with this assessment of audit scope, but then stated 
a higher expectation:
Your committee is satisfied that the detailed scrutiny and verification of the 
cash transactions of large companies can most efficiently and econom­
ically be performed by permanent employees of the corporation, par­
ticularly today, when bookkeeping is to so large an extent done by 
mechanical means, and that it would involve unwarranted expense to 
transfer such work to independent auditors or to require them to duplicate 
the work of the internal organization. Your committee, however, feels that
21. Ibid., p. 169 (Mr. William C. Breed was considered a lobbyist for persons who were 
directors of corporations).
22. U.S. Federal Reserve Board, Verification of Financial Statements, FRB bulletin 
(Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1929), p. 1.
23. AIA, Audits of Corporate Accounts, p. 19.
24. Ibid., p. 23.
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the auditors should assume a definite responsibility for satisfying them­
selves that the system of the internal check provides adequate safeguards 
and should protect the company against any defalcation of major impor­
tance.25
For the purpose of assessing congressional expectations, it is more 
important to analyze the auditors’ view of the extent of their duties than 
the NYSE’s expectations of auditors. Although May, in his role as 
chairman of the AlA’s Special Committee on Cooperation with Stock 
Exchanges, wrote to the Committee on Stock List in December 1933 
that the need for detailed audits existed “where the internal check and 
control are necessarily limited or severely restricted . . . ,” he qualified 
the auditor’s responsibility: “We would, however, point out that it is 
always a matter of judgment on the part of corporate management to 
weigh the risks against which safeguards are desirable in comparison 
with the cost of providing safeguards.”26 May concluded his letter with 
the following statement:
The whole matter lies in the field of discretion, and if in any case a 
defalcation should occur and escape detection, the accountants cannot be 
expected to accept any financial responsibility, but only to accept such 
blame as may attach to a possible error of judgment on their part with 
respect to their review of the methods and extent of the internal check and 
control.27
Management’s ability to place cost constraints on the detection of 
employee defalcations is part of the broader subject of cost constraints 
on audits discussed below.
Testing and Staff Supervision
A new auditor’s report developed in 1933 included the concept of 
sample testing for the first time: “ . . . we examined or tested account­
ing records of the company and other supporting evidence. . . .”28 May 
described the importance of testing in 1933:
While the work of accountants today involves the use of a large staff, it is 
obviously impracticable for the accountant even with a large staff to exam­
ine all the transactions of even a moderate-sized corporation. His pro­
cedure is, therefore, a varied one— in some cases, he will make a fairly 
complete independent check; in other cases, he will make tests; in still 
other cases, he must rely on the records of the corporation, satisfying 
himself that they are so kept and checked as to justify such reliance as a 
reasonable business procedure.
25. Ibid., p. 19.
26. Ibid., pp. 26-27.
27. Id.
28. G. Cochrane, “The Auditor’s Report: Its Evolution in the U.S.A.," The Accountant 123 
(1950): 460.
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In considering, therefore, what degree of responsibility may wisely and 
rightfully be imposed on the accountant, one must start from the premise 
that: (a) his work is in part in the nature of confirmation of facts, and in part 
an expression of judgment; (b) his procedure is necessarily to a large 
extent one of testing— he cannot scrutinize every transaction; (c) his work 
is necessarily carried on largely through subordinates.29
It is important to note May’s last point, that at the time the securities 
acts were adopted an audit required the extensive use of subordi­
nates. The statement was made in a speech that was published in the 
Journal of Accountancy and was, therefore, available to Congress 
when it enacted the 1934 act.30
As discussed in chapter 2, Carter stated at the 1933 Senate hear­
ings that “the detail work of auditing is usually done by a subordi­
nate.”31 Congress may have realized that the auditing process was 
subject to ordinary failures in communication and training.
Auditor Competence
Congressmen and others suggested in 1933-4 that there was a 
wide variation in the competence of auditors. In the course of consider­
ing the federal licensing of auditors,32 Butler testified that in some 
states the statutes licensing accountants were “adequate,” while in 
other states they were “not so adequate.”33 As described above, this 
was the reason that Butler advocated that section 11 of the 1933 act 
require that directors have some responsibility for the accuracy of the 
financial statements.
Senator Couzens stated that the federal licensing of auditors was 
feasible since the Bureau of Internal Revenue had been able to certify 
persons who practiced before it.34 Butler claimed that licensing would 
provoke criticism from those who were not allowed to practice their 
profession, but Couzens dismissed this as unimportant. Butler sug­
gested that the Senate committee might want to consider the licensing 
question in executive session, to determine whether auditors should be 
“controlled” through licensing “to an extent that their statements might
29. G. O. May, Twenty-five Years of Accounting Responsibility: 1911-36, vol. 2 (New 
York: American Institute Publishing Co., 1936), p. 72.
30. The speech was delivered to the Illinois Society of Certified Public Accountants in 
Chicago, Ill., on December 6, 1933, and published in Journal of Accountancy 57
(1934): 9-23.
31. 1933 Senate Hearings, p. 61.
32. 1933 Senate Hearings, pp. 208-210, 247, and U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee 
on Banking and Currency, Hearings on S. Res. 84 and S. Res. 56 and S. Res. 97, 
73d Cong., 2d sess. (1934), p. 7616 [hereinafter cited as 1934 Senate Hearings],
33. 1933 Senate Hearings, p. 247.
34. Ibid., pp. 247-248.
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be taken as a safeguard to the investing public.”35 Butler and Couzens 
agreed that their main concern was that the majority of directors 
should not merely be “advertising matter,” but they concluded their 
exchange by apparently accepting the existing variation in the per­
formance of auditors, Butler stating that “the serious director would 
experience very little difficulty with this law, because he would be 
careful in the selection of his auditors. . . .”36
The issue of licensing of auditors was also discussed at the 1934 
Senate hearings when Healy testified:
Senator Kean: . . .  What I thought was that you ought to have authority 
in this bill to license accountants and engineers. What do you think of that? 
I have just put it to the witness, Mr. Chairman, as to whether the Commis­
sion ought to have authority to license accountants and engineers.
Mr. Healy: My first reply was— some of the committee were busy with 
something else— that I would be very pleased, as far as I am concerned, if 
the day would come when public accountants would be licensed and 
would have to report to stockholders instead of to directors and would 
have a dignified position of responsibility under Federal laws. Whether or 
not public sentiment and the sentiment of Congress is at the point where 
they are willing that engineers and accountants should be licensed by the 
Federal Trade Commission I do not know. I have some doubt about it.
The Chairman: We have enough to deal with now without going into 
outside questions. The complaint about this bill is that it goes too far.
Senator Kean: Yes; it does in some respects; I agree to that. I am 
opposed to the bill in some respects, but I am in favor of having account­
ants that are responsible and engineers that are responsible. For instance, 
if I make an issue of securities I hire the highest class and the best people 
that I can get, and I do not restrain them in any way. They are to make a 
report of the situation. I take their report and publish it, and I am bound 
more or less by that report. I issue securities by it, and I pick the very best 
I can get. If they make mistakes, I suffer.
The Chairman: Would it be any better if they were licensed? Licensed 
men make mistakes.
Mr. Pecora: It would not add to their knowledge or efficiency. The fact 
that a lawyer has a certificate of admission to the bar does not improve his 
knowledge of the law.
Mr. Healy: I should like to interject an observation, if the committee will 
permit, which is not particularly apropos of anything, that eventually the 
solution for many of these problems is going to come from a compulsory 
incorporating or licensing of all corporations engaged in interstate com­
merce.
The Chairman: You mean, to give them Federal charters?37
This testimony from the 1934 Senate hearings leads to the same 
conclusions about congressional consideration of auditors’ compe­
tence as the 1933 Senate hearings.
35. Ibid., p. 248.
36. Id.
37. 1934 Senate Hearings, p. 7616. Part of this testimony is referenced in chap. 1, n. 21, 
in the discussion of “Congressional Consideration of the Role of Auditors Under the 
Securities Acts.”
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In the first place, auditors’ competence and federal licensing of 
auditors were not given profound consideration. At the 1934 Senate 
hearings quoted directly above, Healy found that “ some of the commit­
tee were busy with something else” when he discussed the licensing 
of auditors the first time. He was not being rhetorical when answering, 
“ I do not know,” to the question whether auditors ought to be licensed, 
but the chairman ended the discussion.
At the 1933 Senate hearings Butler suggested that directors in 
Britain could rely on financial statements because in Britain “the central 
Government has absolute control over such experts [e.g., auditors], 
and can demand certain requirements of them.”38 This was an over­
statement of British regulation of auditing. Accountants were not li­
censed in Britain, only their professional institutes were. In fact, it has 
been said that British auditing has always been more “free enterprise” 
than U.S. auditing because of the absence of government involvement 
with licensing.39 Butler’s misconception was not repeated at the 1934 
Senate hearings when the subject of federal licensing of auditors was 
discussed.40 The misinformation at the prior year’s hearings can only 
support the thesis in chapter 1, that Congress lacked a vigorous 
interest in auditing matters.
Secondly, the testimony indicated that there was great variation in 
the competence of auditors. It was stated that the quality of state 
licensing of accountants varied. Directors were advised to “be careful 
in the selection of . . . auditors.”41
Thirdly, there was significant disparagement of auditing, as seen in 
chapter 2. Butler testified that licensing would be required to make the 
auditor’s statement a “safeguard,” and Healy hoped that "the day 
would come” when public accountants “would have a dignified posi­
tion of responsibility under Federal laws.”42
For these reasons, and by rejecting the federal licensing of auditors 
after some evidence that it was feasible, Congress appeared to lack 
interest in affirmatively raising the performance level of auditors.
Auditing Firm Competence
The congressional hearings produced testimony implying that the 
small accounting firms were less competent than the larger ones. 
Congress could have anticipated that the financial statements of
38. 1933 Senate Hearings, p. 247.
39. Professor Brief made this statement in an interview described in chap. 1, n. 33.
40. 1934 Senate Hearings, p. 7616.
41. 1933 Senate Hearings, p. 248.
42. Id. and 1934 Senate Hearings, p. 7616, respectively. However, as discussed above, 
this testimony must be tempered by its context— an attempt to have Congress place 
greater responsibilities on directors.
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smaller companies would be reviewed by smaller accounting firms. 
The large accounting firms would avoid audits of companies which 
were not well established because such companies had a greater 
likelihood of producing 1933 act liability. Douglas and Bates, writing 
shortly after the 1933 act was adopted, stated: “ It may be expected 
that the reputable [accounting] firms may be more chary than ever of 
becoming experts for any but the more substantial issuers."43 If Con­
gress did not expect that the 1933 act would prevent small companies 
from raising capital,44 then Congress could have anticipated that small 
accounting firms would be reviewing the financials for 1933 act regis­
tration statements.
When members of the Senate Banking and Currency Committee 
questioned Carter about the cost of audits, they inquired about the 
cost for the “thousands of small companies putting out an issue for 
their original financing.”45 However, Congress might have anticipated 
that only large companies would be entering the equity markets, since 
Congress was told that underwriters would only participate in issues by 
such companies because of their own exposure to 1933 act liability.46 
Furthermore, size of the issuer was then, as now, a requirement for 
listing on an exchange, and the “OTC” market was not effective to 
handle the trading of small issues. Therefore, the small accounting 
firms would not be frequently involved with 1933 act registration state­
ments.
In any event, testimony on the tiered structure of the accounting 
profession must have lowered congressional expectations of auditors’ 
duties to some extent. Healy told the 1933 House hearings that there 
are “many fine accounting firms,” and “many accounting firms that are 
not so fine.”47 At the 1933 Senate hearings Huston Thompson engaged 
in the following dialogue:
Mr. Thompson: . . . Senator Couzens, I think if I were in that position 
[director of a large corporation] I would see to it that I got the very best 
accountants possible, persons I could depend on.
Senator Couzens: That is true.
Mr. Thompson: Ernst & Ernst, or somebody like them.48
As cited above, Butler, testifying at the same hearings, stated that 
“the serious director would experience very little difficulty with this law, 
because he would be careful in the selection of his auditors. . . .”49 It is 
unclear whether Butler was referring to individual auditors or to audit­
43. Douglas and Bates, “The Federal Securities Act of 1933,” p. 198.
44. 1933 House Hearings, p. 243.
45. 1933 Senate Hearings, pp. 60-61.
46. 1933 House Hearings, p. 243.
47. Ibid., p. 244.
48. 1933 Senate Hearings, p. 210.
49. Ibid., p. 248.
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ing firms. Large accounting firms tend to have more experience with 
corporate and securities matters and to have certain structural advan­
tages over smaller firms, of which Congress, in 1933-4, may have been 
aware.
Price Waterhouse & Co. stated the following in a 1933 letter to its 
branch offices regarding notification to the national office of objections 
to a client’s “form or substance of accounts” : “Obviously, unless the 
leading firms take a stand for proper principles when the necessity 
arises, it is not fairly to be expected that the smaller firms, which 
occupy a much less favorable position, will do so.”50 The “ less favor­
able position” of smaller firms results from the greater likelihood that 
they will be dependent on one or a few clients for economic survival, 
which is also the case for small local offices of large firms.
National office review provides another structural advantage for 
larger firms, since the audit staff can contact in-house specialists on 
various matters. The auditor’s increased competence is also useful in 
resisting client demands. Although there does not appear to be spe­
cific evidence of congressional awareness of national office review, 
testimony quoted in this study has shown that congressmen seemed to 
have general familiarity with the large accounting firms.
In sum, committee members who considered the 1933 act seemed 
to believe that large accounting firms were more prepared to handle 
new responsibilities under that act, but they did not take particular 
action based on that belief.
Independence Under Client “Pressure”
The greater ability of large firms to withstand client “ pressure” has 
been discussed in the previous subsection. Congress may have ex­
pected that auditors generally would be able to resist client pressure 
because of the trend in that direction in 1933 and the effect of enacting 
laws that placed heavy responsibilities on auditors.
The Trend in 1933
Cochrane reports that auditors had little authority vis-^-vis their 
clients in the early 1920s:
Efforts were continually made by outstanding accountants to discourage 
. . . misleading accounting and reporting methods but, unfortunately, the 
professional accountant was not then clothed with authority either by stat­
50. A letter to all United States and Canadian Offices of Price Waterhouse & Co., 
January 16, 1933, in May, Twenty-five Years, vol. 1, pp. 145-146.
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ute or by public acceptance. Corporate management frequently depended 
on its legal advisers for accounting advice and the efforts of accountants 
to obtain acceptance of the accounting principles involved were nullified 
by advice that the presentation desired by the company was legal.51
According to Cochrane, by the late 1920s “accountants more and 
more frequently objected to the practices used and many insisted 
upon qualifications in their reports,” 52 although there is no specific 
evidence that this trend was brought to the attention of Congress.
Liability Under the Securities Acts
Congress could have expected that enactment of the securities 
acts, especially the 1933 act, would strengthen the auditor’s ability to 
influence the preparation and presentation of financial statements. The 
auditor’s report was widely required by a federal statute and an admin­
istrative agency, and it could create civil and criminal liability for the 
auditor. Cochrane stated: “The [1933] Act, of course, placed a new 
and heavy responsibility on the professional accountant and, of neces­
sity, increased his authority.”53 Staub, speaking in 1941, expressed this 
point in the following way:
Accountants have taken seriously the provisions of the two securities acts 
and have sought to impress the importance thereof on their clients as well, 
particularly in respect of those accounting matters which are particularly 
within the scope of the auditor’s duties. The requirements of the acts and 
the activities of the Securities and Exchange Commission have given 
valuable support to accountants in their continuous efforts for improve­
ments in accounting practice and for the adequacy of disclosures essential 
to presenting a complete picture of financial position and results of opera­
tions.54
A new law can be welcome because it provides a reason for not 
participating in questionable conduct. For example, financial vice-pres­
idents of corporations have been better able to resist the pressure from 
security analysts and others to disclose “ inside information” since the 
SEC began its pursuit of insider “tipping” in the mid-1960s.55 Auditors 
have probably welcomed the recent enactment of a law against most 
kinds of foreign bribes.56 Auditors had a similar reaction to their in­
creased responsibilities in 1933-4.
51. Cochrane, "The Auditor’s Report,” pp. 449-450.
52. Ibid., p. 450.
53. Ibid., p. 454.
54. Staub, Auditing Developments, p. 25.
55. Wiesen, “Disclosure of Inside Information— Materiality and Texas Gulf Sulphur’,” 
Maryland Law Review 28 (1968): 221.
56. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977.
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Time and Cost Constraints
Congress considered the time and cost of audits for 1933 act 
registration statements and for the annual reporting requirement under 
the 1934 act. Some congressmen were concerned that there would be 
insufficient time and money for a yearly audit.
Time Constraints
When Congress considered the proposal for federal auditors under 
the 1933 act it did not contemplate that there would be time constraints 
on such audits. Registration statements under the act would be filed 
throughout the year, and therefore, the auditor’s work would be likely to 
be distributed over the year.
At the 1934 Senate hearings, May implied that if the proposed 1934 
act did not require that the fiscal years of regulated companies be 
staggered, Congress should expect some deficiencies in auditor serv­
ices:
If the amount of auditing required were expanded as this bill would neces­
sitate, it would tax the resources of the accounting profession. The great 
difficulty of the present position is that nearly all companies end their year 
at December 31, and if the amount of work to be done at December 31 
were so enormously increased as this bill would increase it, then I do not 
think it would be within the capacity of the accounting profession, by any 
reasonable expansion, to take care of that work within a reasonable period 
after the end of the year.
I would like to see introduced into the bill a provision which would help to 
distribute the work of auditing over the year. I think it would enormously 
increase the value of the audit to the investor.57
The SEC perceived the same problem six years later in the McKes­
son & Robbins case:
We deplore, as do accounting firms, the necessity for recruiting large 
numbers of temporary employees during a very short busy season. This 
condition and the lack of training in the firm ’s methods which it ordinarily 
entails are inimical to attaining the best results from the auditors’ services. 
A major improvement in this condition could be made by the general 
adoption by corporations of the natural business year for accounting pur­
poses.58
Since Congress was informed in 1934 of the difficulty accounting 
firms would have in sending highly trained staff on audits in the first 
three months of each year, Congress appears to have been conscious 
of the time parameters which the 1934 act would create.
57. 1934 Senate Hearings, pp. 7177-78.
58. U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, In the Matter of McKesson & Robbins, 
ASR no. 19 (December 5, 1940), p. 4.
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Cost Constraints
As discussed in chapter 2, Congress did not give great thought to 
the proposal for federal audits, partly because such audits would not 
be a very extensive undertaking. Congress expected that federal au­
dits would be (1) performed by persons who might have limited audit­
ing experience and would certainly have limited experience with the 
audited company, (2) performed by a small number of auditors, (3) 
funded solely from registration fees, and (4) conducted without exten­
sive guidelines. Therefore, the congressmen at the 1933 Senate hear­
ings were inclined toward low audit costs when they dropped the 
federal audit proposal and considered independent audits.
Carter provided a sanguine description of the ability of companies 
to pay for an audit by an independent accountant in the following two 
dialogues at the 1933 Senate hearings:
Mr. C arte r: Eighty-five percent of all the companies listed on the New 
York Stock Exchange have independent audits.
Senator Gore: So it would not be any added expense?
Mr. Carter: Not to them.
The Chairman: This bill covers all of them, those listed and those not 
listed.
Mr. C arte r: Those are the ones that should be independently audited. 
Senator Reynolds: Which ones?
Mr. C arte r: Those that are not listed.
Senator Reynolds: All right; the ones that are not listed are the little 
fellows, are they not?
Mr. C arte r: Yes, sir.
Senator Reynolds: Could they pay you $75 a day to go into their 
books?
Mr. C arte r: They do not have to.
Senator Reynolds: Who pays you?
Mr. Carter: It does not cost them $75 a day.
Senator Reynolds: How much do you charge a day, then?
Mr. C arte r: It would cost them an average of, I should say, $25 a day. 
Senator Kean: What big companies charge $25?
Mr. Carter: That is about an average.
Senator Kean: Marwick, Mitchell & Co. cost more than that.
Mr. Carter: i am giving you an average.
Senator Kean: Waterhouse & Co. cost more than that. What companies 
do you know of that charge only $25 a day?
Mr. C arte r: I said that was an average for all. The rates range from 
$100 a day for a partner down to $15 and $20 a day for a junior. The 
average scale of rates that are charged are $35, $30, $25, $20 and $15, 
depending upon the class of men.
Senator Kean: How many men would it take?
Mr. C arte r: Put one partner in.
Senator Kean: Only put one partner in?
Mr. C arte r: Yes, sir.
Senator Kean: That is $100 a day.
Mr. Carter: That is right, at that rate for the proportion of his time 
devoted, and he is usually worth it.
Senator Reynolds: How many days does it take on the average to 
audit a small company?
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Mr. Carter: It would depend upon the business.
Senator Reynolds: Of course, I understand, but generally, Colonel, just 
give me some idea.
Mr. Carter: Well, take a company selling automobiles doing a rela­
tively small business, you could probably audit it in two days and a half.
Senator Reynolds: That would be $250?
Mr. Carter: Yes; assuming the highest rate for partner, the detail work 
of auditing is usually done by a subordinate.59
Senator Adams: How much of a burden is this going to put on the 
comparatively small company? You were speaking a while back of 
the companies whose stocks are listed being independently audited. Now 
coming under the control of this bill are going to be thousands of small 
companies putting out an issue for their original financing. How much of a 
burden and cost is that going to put on them?
Mr. Carter: Very little measured in value to the investor and to them.
Senator Gore: What would be the range?
Mr. C arte r: My experience would be that the average company pays 
around $500 or $600 or $700 for its auditing, that is, taking the large and 
small together.
Senator Gore: How often do they resort to that?
Mr. Carter: Every year. And the largest organizations of our country do 
it and have been doing it for the last 15 years.
Senator Gore: Have had these independent audits made?
Mr. Carter: Have had these independent audits made, yes.60
The hourly fees of auditors have increased about tenfold since 
Carter’s 1933 estimate. Congress might have expected that auditors’ 
hourly rates would rise dramatically due to increased auditors’ respon­
sibilities, which would necessarily lead to increased education require­
ments, “support” staff specialists, and legal costs and damages. 
However, Congress could not have projected, from Carter’s testimony, 
the hours required for audits of financial statements currently filed with 
the SEC pursuant to either of the securities acts.61 Some senators 
seemed skeptical at first of Carter’s low estimates of audit costs, but 
the Senate committee did not insist that he explain his assumptions 
more precisely. The Senate committee was apparently satisfied that 
audit costs would be reasonable.
At the 1934 Senate hearings, May indicated that public companies 
might have to pay very high annual audit fees:
Mr. May: . . .  We happen to be discussing the question with the Stand­
59. 1933 Senate Hearings, pp. 60-61.
60. Ibid., p. 59.
61. Schneider and Manko, “Going Public: Practice, Procedure and Consequences,” 
Villanova Law Review 15 (1970): 283 [reproduced in part in Wiesen, Regulating 
Transactions in Securities, p. 48], made the following estimate of accounting fees for 
a company “going public” : “ If there have been no prior audits and new accountants 
are engaged at the time of the offering, fees in the $25,000 to $50,000 range, and 
even higher, would not be unusual." The authors imply that the fee could not be 
much less.
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ard Oil Co. of New Jersey just now in regard to what an annual audit might 
cost.
Senator Kean: What kind of a figure did you give them, if I may ask?
Mr. May: I told them it was so enormous that we could not make any 
commitment. But I should say an annual audit of the Standard Oil of New 
Jersey would probably cost, with all its several hundred companies in­
cluded, certainly a quarter of a million, possibly more.
Senator Kean: A quarter of a million dollars each time?
Mr. May: Yes. That would be doing it the quickest possible way. It 
would be doing it at the end of the year and not working on it all the way 
through. . . .62
The conflict between the estimates by Carter and May of the cost 
of annual audits can be explained by the respective purposes of their 
testimony. Carter wanted to dissuade Congress from requiring federal 
audits, and therefore he emphasized the low cost of independent 
audits. May apparently did not want Congress to require annual audits, 
and therefore he emphasized their high cost. The Senate committee’s 
failure to question May in 1934 about Carter’s testimony the previous 
year indicates a lack of congressional interest in auditing. However, by 
not objecting to May’s assertion that audits might be performed “ the 
quickest possible way,” the Senate committee displayed a concern 
that audit costs be maintained at reasonable levels.
Estimating Income
Congress was informed at the 1934 House hearings that many 
companies were closing their books on December 31, although it was 
not the end of their “natural year.”63 At the 1934 Senate hearings, May 
gave examples of more “ natural years” : September or October clos­
ings for automobile and tire companies, October closings for packing 
houses, and June closings for railroads.64
Since Congress did not require “ natural” closing dates, Congress 
may have been willing to tolerate two effects on auditing. In the first 
place, calendar year ends create staffing problems as discussed 
above. Secondly, “unnatural” closing dates magnify the problems of 
matching revenues and expenses.
62. 1934 Senate Hearings, pp. 7182-83.
63. U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, Hearings 
on H.R. 7852 and H.R. 8720, 73d Cong., 2d sess. (1934), p. 652. The statement was 
made in a memorandum prepared by J. Harry Covington, counsel for the AIA.
64. 1934 Senate Hearings, p. 7186. The statement was made in a memorandum pre­
pared by May.
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The Auditor’s Report
Cochrane describes the four changes in the auditor’s report 
through 1933. The first report stated that the “ books” of the company 
had been audited.65 After minor changes in a second report, the report 
that took effect around 1931 stated that the “accounts” of the company 
had been examined.66 The new report in 1933 stated that the “account­
ing records” had been examined “or tested.”67 Congress should have 
expected that the auditor’s report would be changed, and its as­
surances reduced, after the passage of the securities acts.
65. Cochrane, The Auditor’s Report, p. 449.
66. Ibid., p. 451.
67. Ibid., p. 453.
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Conclusion
An examination of congressional intent regarding auditors’ duties 
under the securities acts produces little “primary” evidence of con­
gressional expectations. However, testimony at committee hearings 
and published commentaries about the state of auditing in 1933-4 
permits reasonable support for some conclusions. Such “extrinsic” 
evidence can be used to deduce what Congress meant to achieve in 
the acts, because, as one legal research scholar recently wrote, “ . . . 
American courts exclude almost no form of extrinsic aid in the inter­
pretation of statutes.” 1
Some people have believed that Congress made a thorough study 
of auditing in 1933-4. For example, the SEC stated in a 1958 release 
that the 1933 Senate hearings “considered at length the value to 
investors and to the public of an audit by accountants not connected 
with the company or management and whether the additional expense 
to industry of an audit by independent accountants was justified by the 
expected benefits to the public” (emphasis supplied).2 This study con­
cludes that the securities acts were quite thoroughly conceived and 
debated generally, but that the duties of auditors were not of great 
interest to congressmen.
The securities acts were not adopted casually. The acts were 
drafted by leading lawyers, who were able to refer to previous se­
curities regulation bills that had been introduced into Congress, to 
state “Blue Sky” laws, and to the British Companies Act. Congressional 
hearings considered the views of the draftsmen and of some of the 
leading spokesmen of the accounting profession.
On the other hand, an analysis of the legislative history indicates a 
lack of knowledge about auditing on the part of congressmen and less 
than a vigorous interest in the topic when it was raised at hearings. 
The 1933 proposal to have federal auditors was never advanced 
beyond a preliminary consideration, and the creation of the SEC in
1. Sloane, “Legal Research: Federal Legislative History,” New York Law Journal, De­
cember 14, 1976, p. 4, col. 1.
2. U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, Independence of Certifying Accountants, 
ASR no. 81 (December 11, 1958), p. 2.
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1934 appears to have been an extravagant substitution for profound 
thinking about the duties of auditors.
The absence of careful consideration of auditors’ duties tends to 
rebut the argument that Congress was placing heavy responsibilities 
on auditors. Also supporting “ low” expectations of auditors’ duties was 
testimony emphasizing the limitations of accounting and auditing, the 
inadequate qualification standards for accountants in some states, and 
the absence of a unified national association of accountants. The 
statements of a spokesman of the accounting profession, which led to 
the rejection of federal auditors, could promise little in independent 
auditor services because of the insufficient thought which had been 
given to the plans for federal auditors.
On the other hand, a “high” degree of expectations could be 
supported by the provisions of section 11 of the 1933 act, the creation 
of the SEC in the 1934 act, the progress in auditing in the fifty years 
prior to 1933-4, and the possibly high expectations of investors.
The SEC seems to apply the securities acts to auditors on the basis 
of high congressional expectations. This may be justified by the broad 
language in the acts delegating authority over auditing to the SEC, the 
remedial purposes of the securities acts, the creation of the SEC itself, 
and the absence of specific congressional intent regarding auditors’ 
duties. However, an application of the acts to auditors should be 
bound by (a) specific congressional expectations of auditors and au­
diting and (b) the requirement that statutes cannot be too vague.
Congressional intent regarding specific auditor services highlights 
two themes. In the first place, Congress was particularly concerned 
with the balance of responsibility between accountants and directors, 
and between accountants, corporate managers, and underwriters, gen­
erally. Secondly, Congress was aware of some of the limitations of 
auditing, especially reliance on subordinates, the time and cost con­
straints of audits, and variations in auditor and auditing firm compe­
tence. Congress appeared to have an understanding of these inherent 
problems of auditing if the silence of congressmen when told of these 
problems at the hearings on the securities acts can be construed as 
legislative intent.
Courts and the SEC seem to have adopted a flexible and expand­
able approach to auditors’ responsibilities under the securities acts. A 
House committee report accompanying the 1933 act bill may have 
contemplated this approach: “The duty of care to discover varies in its 
demand upon participants in the security distribution with the impor­
tance of their place in the scheme of distribution and with the degree 
of protection that the public has a right to expect” (emphasis sup­
plied).3 Similarly, Landis, in a speech to accountants shortly after the
3. U.S., Congress, House, H. Rep. 85, 73d Cong., 1st sess., 1933, p. 9. 
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1933 act was passed, referred to "the flexibilities inherent in the Act 
and its capacities for adaptation to the complexities of the situations it 
covers.” He went on to tell the audience that to understand the 1933 
act, accountants should “[remember] always .. . that the public inter­
est and the protection of investors must be the guiding consideration.”4 
In 1939 the SEC’s chief accountant described this flexible approach 
to interpretation of the securities acts as they affect accountants:
By statutory mandate, it is thus the duty of the Commission in each 
problem it faces to keep in mind not only “What does the public investor 
receive,” but also “What is the public investor entitled to expect." For­
tunately, the Congress has invested the Commission with regulatory and 
rule making powers designed to ensure that the answers to these two 
questions shall not be unreasonably different.5
Not only the SEC, but the courts too, have interpreted the securities 
acts to meet the changing expectations of the public, as seen in the 
following statement by A. A. Sommer when he was an SEC commis­
sioner:
It is clear that in very large measure the courts have shaped the respon­
sibilities of the auditors and provided them with benchmarks against which 
to measure their conduct because the auditors were slow in doing so 
themselves in response to such “surging” forces in society as a great 
demand for disclosure, a greater involvement of the public in the securities 
markets, more insistence upon disclosure reasonably understandable in 
the marketplace, and more demanding definition of the role of the auditor 
in this society.6
Court opinions, such as in the BarChris case, have appended 
elaborate rules of conduct for auditors onto rather bare provisions of 
the securities acts.7 According to Chatov, the accounting profession 
has sought “ flexibility” from the 1920s to the present in order to avoid 
direct government control.
It is difficult to denote the limits to administrative agency and court 
interpretation of statutes. Courts and agencies should ascertain legisla­
tive intent when applying a statute. Agencies are limited in the creation
4. J. M. Landis, “Liability Sections of Securities Act Authoritatively Discussed,” an 
address before the Eleventh Annual Fall Conference of the NYS Society of CPAs 
held in New York City, October 30, 1933, appearing in The American Accountant 18 
(1933): 334.
5. W. W. Werntz, “What Is Expected of the Independent Auditor: From the Viewpoint of 
the Investor,” an address delivered at the annual meeting of the American Institute 
of Accountants September 21, 1939 (Washington, D.C.: Securities and Exchange 
Commission), p. 1.
6. “The Legal Liability of the Accountant,” an address by Commissioner A. A. Sommer, 
September 24, 1973, reprinted in Wiesen, Regulating Transactions in Securities (St. 
Paul, Minn.: West Publishing Co., 1975), p. 279.
7. See Escott v. BarChris Construction Corp., 283 F. Supp. 643 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
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of rules by the requirement that the applicable statute be sufficiently 
specific in its delegation of authority to the agency.
Only in rare cases has legislation been successfully attacked for 
lacking specificity. Therefore, agencies and courts have been able to 
create responsibilities that comport with the public’s expectations. Fur­
thermore, the failure of Congress to object to an interpretation of its 
legislation, such as the application of the securities acts to auditors, 
provides some evidence of legislative intent.
Landis reported in his 1933 speech quoted above,
No member of either House at any time voted against the passage of the 
bill, nor took occasion to criticize any provision that the bill contained. . . .  I 
cite [this and other] facts merely as illustrative of a Congress with its 
emotions unaroused but deeply conscious of the evils which unrestrained 
exploitation of our capital resources had brought into existence.8
When Congress voted on the securities acts, the actual duties of 
auditors must have seemed to be an area in which flexibility, reflecting 
actual experience, would be appropriate. Congress thereby left pos­
terity with the dilemma of placing proper limits on the application of the 
securities acts to auditors.
8. J. M. Landis, “Liability Sections of Securities Act Authoritatively Discussed,’’ p. 330. 
52
